

SECRET.

No 1 A

MILITARY NEEDS OF THE EMPIRE
IN A WAR
WITH FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

MINUTES.

C. in C..

I HAVE not had time thoroughly to examine and criticize this Scheme; but it has been prepared in general accordance with my instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Altham, after frequent personal discussions of the main points involved.

Your Lordship will see at p. 28 that it is proposed to augment the British garrison of India by about 29,000 men. I doubt whether the India Office or the Government of India would agree at present to quite so large an increase, though probably an increase of from 10,000 to 15,000 would be concurred in.

Another point is the proposed large increase in the Army serving abroad in peace time—see p. 45. This knocks the linked-battalion system on the head; but in view of our military requirements in South Africa for some years to come, this system must in any case be modified. I am inclined to think that before long we shall have to offer the soldier higher pay when he is serving abroad, as well as periodical furlough to the United Kingdom. If these concessions were granted, we might reasonably lengthen the period of colour service abroad, but at home it is desirable to shorten the period of colour service, in order to provide an adequate number of reservists. These questions, however, have, I think, been fully dealt with in your Lordship's remarks on the Report of Lord Wantage's Committee.

I hope that your Lordship will concur in my opinion that great credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Altham for the care and ability with which he has drawn up this Scheme. It is, as far as I know, the first serious attempt to deal in a comprehensive manner with the problem of meeting the gravest military danger to which the nation is exposed. And it is obvious that the organization of the Army should be based on our requirements for the defensive and offensive action which such a Scheme as the present, when finally approved, may show to be necessary.

(Signed) W. G. NICHOLSON, D.G.M.I.

August 15, 1901.

C. in C.,

I now add a few remarks to my previous Minute.

In the inclosed paper an attempt has been made to summarize the military requirements of the Empire; and if the estimate put forward is generally accepted, it remains to be considered how these requirements can best be met.

The first point that has to be dealt with is the inequality between the number of the battalions abroad and the number at home. It is proposed in the paper under discussion to increase the British garrison of India by 25 battalions.* It is, perhaps, rather doubtful whether the Government of India would be willing to pay for so large an increase, supposing the War Office to be in a position to supply the additional units required, but from what I can gather it seems likely that the India Office would be in favour of the proposal. In order, however, not to exaggerate the probable difference in number between the battalions abroad and at home, I will assume in this Minute that the reinforcement of the Indian garrison is limited to 10 battalions.

It may be also assumed that for some time to come the South African garrison will require at least 18 battalions of regular infantry, exclusive of the 2 battalions allotted to the defence of the coaling station at Cape Town.

* Paragraph 37.

It follows, then, that the number of battalions to be provided for foreign service will be as follows :—

India, 52 + 10	62
Egypt (as proposed in the present scheme)	6
South Africa	18
Colonies (including Cape Town)	20
Total	106

If we succeed in raising 8 garrison battalions for colonial service, the above total will be reduced to 98.

The total number of line battalions is 156, and consequently the proportion abroad to the proportion at home would, under the above conditions, be 98 to 58—difference 40.

Or, supposing the British garrison of India to remain unchanged, the proportions would be 88 to 68—difference 20.

From the point of view of the defence of India, there is much to be said in favour of an increase in its British garrison, the situation in that country having been materially affected by the steady advance of Russia towards the Afghan frontier.

The question that arises is how the excess of battalions abroad can be supplied with the necessary drafts of trained and mature soldiers, and how the force of regular infantry at home can be kept up in adequate strength and in a state of efficiency.

It has long been acknowledged that the obligation to supply drafts to battalions abroad seriously lessens the efficiency of the linked battalions at home, and for this reason alone I would suggest the enlargement of regimental depôts, wherever ground is available, or can be acquired at reasonable cost, for purposes of company training. A depôt should, in my opinion, be large enough to accommodate and train recruits before they are transferred to the home battalion, and, to some extent, at any rate, before they are transferred to the foreign service battalion, though, of course, in the latter case the question of age comes in. Provided that recruits of the proper age are forthcoming, a depôt 400 strong should be able to supply drafts for two battalions on foreign service, and a *fortiori* for one battalion on foreign service and one battalion at home.

The minimum inequality between battalions abroad and at home being likely to amount on the termination of the war to 20, it is for consideration whether this difficulty can be met by enlarging the depôts, whether it will be desirable to increase the Regular Army by 20 battalions, or whether the proposal put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel Altham partially to embody 20 Militia battalions* is practicable. The third course does not commend itself to me. Its feasibility is a matter of conjecture, while at the best it would be a temporary and make-shift arrangement.

In calculating the inequality I have not accepted Lieutenant-Colonel Altham's premiss that, on the conclusion of the war, 5 battalions of Guards will be retained in South Africa, and this accounts for a difference of 5 line battalions between his figures and mine.

I admit that the enlargement of depôts will entail an increase in the establishment of regimental officers, and also an increase in the home establishment of soldiers, but these increases are not likely to exceed, even if they equal, in cost the raising of enough fresh battalions to render the number of battalions at home equal to the number abroad.

Nor, so far as I can judge, is there likely to be much difference in regard to the cost of providing extra barrack accommodation. In 1900 there was accommodation available in the United Kingdom for 72 infantry battalions, barracks for two more battalions having been condemned for sanitary and other reasons. From this number 10 must be deducted on account of 10 battalions of Foot Guards, and out of the remaining 62, it has been proposed to re-appropriate 4 for artillery and other arms, reducing the available total to 58. The number of line battalions is 156, and in order to accommodate half that number or 78 battalions at home, the Barrack Committee have put forward the following proposals :—

(a.) Hutments for 10 battalions, built in 1900, to be completed for permanent occupation.

* Paragraph 84.

- (b.) Hutments for 8 battalions to be built on Salisbury Plain.
 (c.) Hutments for 2 additional battalions to be built at Bordon, thus completing the accommodation for the 3rd Division, Aldershot Army Corps.

As previously noted, we are likely to have either 98 or 88 battalions abroad. Assuming the above barrack programme to be carried out, if fresh battalions were raised to produce an equality between the home and foreign service battalions, additional barracks would have to be built in the first case for 98-78 or 20 battalions, and in the second case for 88-78 or 10 battalions. On the other hand, under the same assumption as before, if, instead of raising any fresh battalions, the regimental depôts were enlarged, we should have in the first case a surplus of barrack accommodation to the extent of 78-58 or 20 battalions, and in the second case of 78-68 or 10 battalions.

This seems a waste of money, and until a definite decision has been arrived at on this question, and until we are certain that fresh barrack accommodation is likely to be needed within the next few years, it might perhaps be expedient to postpone the construction of the large number of new barracks recommended by the Barrack Committee.

Other questions of high importance incidentally raised in Lieutenant-Colonel Altham's paper are the best method of obtaining recruits for the Regular Army, and the measures to be adopted with a view to improving the efficiency of the Militia and facilitating its employment abroad in the event of war.

As regards recruiting, it would seem almost impossible to introduce any form of conscription in the case of men who are ordered to serve abroad. The only course that presents itself is to improve the conditions of foreign service in the way of pay and furlough. But perhaps a modified form of conscription might be adopted for home service, the period of colour service being limited to three years, and the men being allowed to volunteer during that period for prolonged service abroad.

As regards the Militia, I believe that the officers and men would gladly accept the liability to foreign service in war time, and that their standard of efficiency would soon be raised, if in the matter of training and discipline more attention were paid to them by the local military authorities.

In conclusion, I may remark that the essential feature in the scheme now propounded is that our Army should be so organized as not only to make due provision for home defence, but to have in readiness five instead of three Army Corps for war service outside the United Kingdom. The arguments on which this conclusion is based are, of course, open to discussion. I doubt, however, whether our military needs in the event of war with France and Russia have been overstated. Anyhow, it seems very desirable that a decision should be come to and a standard of preparation prescribed by the Secretary of State and His Majesty's Government, so that the organization of the Army may conform to the requirements of Imperial defence.

(Signed) W. G. NICHOLSON, D.G.M.I.

October 9, 1901.

S. of S.,

This paper is satisfactory, in so far as it tends to show that we have a force at our disposal which, if properly trained and organized, would be sufficient to meet any probable emergency. But while the force for home defence seems in excess of our requirements, that for expeditionary action and for the reinforcement of our Indian and colonial garrisons is seriously deficient.

The formation of six Army Corps in the United Kingdom is no doubt an important step towards the better organization of the Auxiliary Forces, and the preparation for war of tactical units complete in all essential details. There are, however, several administrative questions of primary urgency, which will have to be considered and decided at an early date. First among these is the course to be adopted to keep the Regular Army up to its proper strength, especially when a large number of time-expired men pass into the reserve on the conclusion of the war. A second question which will have to be dealt with is the inequality between the number of battalions abroad and at home, in regard to which I am inclined to favour the solution suggested by Major-General Nicholson, provided that it be found practicable to enlarge the regimental depôts. The increase in the establishment of regimental officers consequent on such an enlargement would be a great advantage on the reserves being called out, the supply of

reserve officers being at present quite inadequate to meet our requirements on mobilization.

It must, however, be borne in mind that, even if the depôts be enlarged, the number of battalions at home cannot be reduced below a certain point. Not only do we require regular infantry for home garrisons, but we ought to have an adequate surplus, available for expeditionary action on a moderate scale without calling out the reserve. If the British force in India is materially increased, it may be found necessary to raise some fresh battalions, in which case it would be advisable to attach them to existing two-battalion regiments, so as to form more regiments of four battalions each. In a four-battalion regiment one battalion at home with enlarged regimental depôt ought to be able to supply drafts to three battalions abroad.

I am in favour of permanently strengthening the British garrison of India to such an extent as may admit of an active military policy being promptly adopted in the event of complications arising with Russia beyond the north-west frontier. Under such circumstances, to confine ourselves to a passively defensive attitude would be most detrimental to our interests and prestige in the East. Until the Navy had gained complete command of the sea, we could not rely on being able to send the requisite reinforcements to India, and our naval predominance might not be established for some months. I understand that the Government of India are strongly of opinion that the British force now at their disposal would be insufficient to meet the contingency above referred to, and this was my own view when I was Commander-in-chief in India. I estimated that 30,000 additional British troops would be needed at once, and about 60,000 more within six months.

Another question is the reorganization of the Militia in such a way as may not only increase its fighting efficiency, but enable us to employ it in war time abroad as well as at home, without being dependent on the readiness or otherwise of each corps to volunteer for foreign service.

The scheme of operations put forward in the present paper seems to me generally sound. It recognizes the obligation to reinforce the British garrison of India, and lays stress on the importance of taking offensive action instead of confining ourselves to the passive defence of the United Kingdom. The main lesson to be drawn from the scheme is the paramount necessity for improving the training and organization of the Auxiliary Forces, so that they may be prepared to supplement the Regular Army in the event of war, and to take an active share in the duties of home defence.

I concur with Major-General Nicholson in thinking that the organization and strength of our Army should be based on the military requirements we should have to meet, and the military action it would be proper for us to take, during the most serious war in which we are likely to be engaged.

(Signed) ROBERTS, F.M.

October 17, 1901.

C. in C.,

I have detained this paper during the various discussions which have taken place on the Estimates because, while we were dealing with one of the most important questions raised above, it would not have been practicable to raise questions altering the strength and organization of the forces, which, with your sanction, I put before the Cabinet last year.

Some of General Nicholson's figures exceed the organization then proposed, but his estimate is based on a garrison both in India and South Africa, which has not yet been agreed to by the Cabinet. Indeed, in the case of South Africa we have not the premises on which to found a conclusion.

Without challenging seriatim the proposals in this very able paper, I would make the following observations:—

1. We have proposed alterations in pay and terms of service which we have reason to hope will keep the Army up to strength, and will provide us a reserve equal to mobilization of the whole Army and the up-keep of the whole Army during a campaign.

2. The number of battalions at home will equal the number of those abroad, unless India require more, or a permanently larger establishment of regular infantry is maintained in South Africa. It may be that by a local force of mounted troops we may keep down the South African garrison.

3. Reserve officers: I trust to see a scheme worked out for greatly strengthening us in this important particular.

4. The "small war" reserve of 5,000 men, which can be called out without the machinery of the ordinary reserve, will enable us to send 12,000 men abroad. We can supplement these troops from Malta and Gibraltar, replacing the regiments there from home.

5. I agree—if it becomes necessary to raise them.

6. In this and other papers, you have brought before me the necessity of some form of compulsion for the Militia. This is, no doubt, a solution for our main difficulties in home defence, but the Government will not consider it, unless we fail in other ways to provide for defence. The increased pay now to be offered will have first to be fully tried.

ST. J. B.

January 30, 1902.

MILITARY NEEDS OF THE EMPIRE IN A WAR WITH FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

THE preparation of strategic plans for the contingency of a great war falls naturally under two main heads; first, that of the defensive arrangements which may ward off attack; and, secondly, that of the offensive operations which are needed to bring the war to a successful conclusion. It is obvious that the first must be placed on a satisfactory footing before the second can be considered.

DEFENCE.

The defence of the Empire may be conveniently divided under the four headings of:—

- (A.) The United Kingdom (including Channel Islands).
- (B.) The Colonies and Protectorates.
- (C.) India.
- (D.) Egypt.

(A.)—THE UNITED KINGDOM.

1. Our plans must aim at the defence of the Empire as a whole. The local protection of Great Britain and Ireland, however complete, would, for economic reasons, apart from the duty we owe to our Colonies and dependencies, be quite insufficient to prevent absolute disaster. Nevertheless, if the heart of the Empire fall into the enemy's grasp, its existence must cease, and our first care must, therefore, be for the heart. Home defence, therefore, is the primary problem to be solved.

2. The main factor to determine, with a view to its solution, is, as in the case of all other defence problems, the standard which it is necessary to adopt, or, in other words, the strength of the attack to which these islands are liable.

3. There is no modern experience to guide us. The last successful invasion of England on a large scale was that of William III in 1688, but the conditions of the problem have entirely changed since that now remote date, and, moreover, the circumstances of the invasion were unique, the English Army and the majority of the nation being then in sympathy with the invaders. It is noteworthy, however, that the English fleet, under Dartmouth, was loyal at the time to James II, and yet, owing to the accident of unfavourable winds, was unable to interfere with the landing at Torbay of the expeditionary force.

4. The only occasion within modern times on which England has been in danger of invasion on a serious scale was at the beginning of last century. There was, in fact, a small invasion in Ireland and another in Wales, but the real apprehension arose from the Boulogne flotilla, and the army concentrated by Napoleon to embark thereon. To meet this force we had in the year 1804 under arms:—

Regulars and Militia	301,000
Volunteers (Great Britain)	347,000
„ (Ireland)	70,000
Total	<u>718,000</u>

But, before an opportune moment for its embarkation arose, other events necessitated the diversion of Napoleon's great army against Austria and Russia, and three days after the Austrian capitulation at Ulm, Trafalgar made England absolute mistress of the seas, and terminated all danger of invasion.

5. Much anxiety was, however, again felt on the subject about the middle of the last century, and it is as well to quote the views expressed at that time by men whose utterances must demand attention.

Field-Marshal Sir John Burgoyne wrote as follows:—

"If not probable, at least it is possible, that a temporary naval superiority might be obtained in the Channel, sufficient for the purpose of invasion in great force; and that, if such an attempt should then be made, it is more than probable that it would be successful, and that London itself would be in the hands of the enemy in less than ten days.

"Under such circumstances, how could a war be prolonged?"

"One very important consideration in this apprehended crisis is the relative value of the stake for which each party would have to contend.

"With us it is everything we have in the world, collectively, and, in a great degree, individually, and our very existence as a nation. With the invaders it is only the risk of the loss of the force employed."

The Duke of Wellington, in replying to Sir John Burgoyne, wrote:—

"I am accustomed to the consideration of these questions, and have examined and reconnoitred over and over again the whole coast from the North Foreland by Dover, Folkestone, Beachy Head, Brighton, Arundel, to Selsey Bill, near Portsmouth, and I say that, excepting immediately under the fire of Dover Castle, there is not a spot on the coast on which infantry might not be thrown on shore, at any time of tide, with any wind, and in any weather.

"I know of no mode of resistance, much less of protection, from this danger, excepting by an army in the field capable of meeting and contending with its formidable enemy, aided by all the means of fortification which experience in war and science can suggest.

"I have contemplated the danger to which you have referred; I have done so for years. I have drawn to it the attention of different Administrations at different times.

"I quite concur in all your views of the danger of our position—of the magnitude of the stake at issue.

"I am specially sensible of the certainty of failure if we do not, at an early moment, attend to the measures necessary to be taken for our defence, and of the disgrace—the indelible disgrace—of such failure.

"Do we suppose that we should be allowed to keep, could we advance a pretension to keep, more than the islands composing the United Kingdom?"

"I am bordering on 77 years of age, passed in honour.

"I hope that the Almighty may protect me from being the witness of the tragedy which I cannot persuade my contemporaries to take measures to avert."

Lord Palmerston, in treating of the defence of the country, said:—

"Let any man picture to himself the state this country would be in with London occupied by an enemy's army, the Court and the Government put to flight, the Public Departments in the hands of the enemy, the Bank plundered, the merchants under contribution, the public stores destroyed."

And, with regard to the possible results of an advance of an invading army upon London, that eminent financial authority, the late Lord Overstone, in replying to the questions of the Royal Commission on National Defences in 1859, terminated his momentous letter in the following words:—

"We have ample means of self-defence, in accumulated wealth, and productive energies sufficient to support all necessary expenditure; in mechanical skill and appliances, and in abundance of mineral products, which, properly applied, must render us predominant in all the scientific machinery of modern warfare; in a people proud at heart of their country, attached to its free institutions, and whose courage and self-devotion have never been found to fail in the hour of trial.

“It is useless to discuss what will occur, or what can be done, after London has fallen into the hands of an invading foe.

“If we prove too apathetic to take the necessary precautions, or make the requisite efforts, or too short-sighted and selfish to make the necessary sacrifice, we must bow to the fate which the whole world will declare that we have deserved.”

6. These warnings are deserving of high respect, but their force much depends on the reasonableness of the hypothesis put forward by Sir John Burgoyne, viz., the possibility of an enemy obtaining a temporary naval superiority in the Channel sufficient for the purpose of invasion in great force. As regards this point, the opinions of the Admiralty and of naval officers cannot but have very great weight.

7. The correspondence which passed between the Admiralty and War Office in 1889 relative to this question, and the subsequent proceedings of the “Landing-places Committee” are of much importance, and deserve a somewhat close examination.

In a Minute, dated the 1st June, 1889, addressed by the Assistant-Adjutant-General for Mobilization to the Adjutant-General, it was pointed out that the existing schemes of defence for the United Kingdom were based on estimates and assumptions as to the strength of a possible invading force which had been drawn up solely by military officers, who had no technical knowledge as to the naval questions involved. It was proposed, therefore, that the Admiralty should be asked “to go into the whole question of the places on our coast where foreign troops can land, what time they will take to do so, and what horses, guns, and other impedimenta we may fairly expect to be landed with them.”

In consequence of this Minute, a letter was addressed by the War Office to the Admiralty on the 27th June, 1889, requesting the Admiralty to furnish an estimate of the force which an invader could disembark on certain sections of the coast in one day, in two days, or in three days, under certain specified conditions, one of which was that “it will not be interfered with by our Navy, which must be taken to be absent from the scene of operations.”

The Admiralty replied in letter No. M/1648 of the 17th July, 1889, that “such a contingency as the landing of an enemy on these shores without interference on the part of our Navy is one which, in their Lordships’ opinion, could not arise without the annihilation of the Channel Fleet, our coast-defence vessels, torpedo-boats, and armed merchant-cruisers—a contingency so remote that it would hardly appear to come within the range of speculation. Under these circumstances, my Lords do not consider it possible to make any calculations relating to the practicability of a scheme or undertaking when all the rational obstacles to its success are summarily removed.”

8. The War Office, however, notwithstanding this strong expression of opinion, pressed that the subject should be further examined, and at a Conference assembled in 1889, at which Captains Bridge and Fawkes, R.N., represented the Admiralty, and Colonels C. Grove and Salmond the War Office, the following queries were drawn up for reference to the Admiralty, with a view to their furnishing the War Office with replies to them:—

Queries.

On the assumption that invasion, though its great improbability is allowed for, is a possibility, and that the coast from the south of the Thames to Portsmouth is the part on which a descent is most likely to be attempted, the questions are:—

- (1.) On what section or sections of the above coast is the attempt most likely to be made?
- (2.) Supposing that the enemy had six weeks’ time for preparation, what troops could be landed on any of these sections?
- (3.) What would be the maximum time under the most favourable circumstances in which a complete division could be landed?

The whole maritime forces of France are assumed to be at the disposal of the enemy for performing the above operations, and the ships conveying the men to be as crowded as possible.

These queries were referred to the Admiralty, who replied in a letter the gist of which was that it was labour thrown away to answer the questions, as the underlying assumption that the landing would not be seriously interfered with by our Navy was so entirely beyond the bounds of reasonable probability that work resting on it would be of no real value. The letter, however, concluded with the statement that, if the

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Secretary of State for War still desired the information, the Admiralty would select two naval officers to work it out in conjunction with two representatives of the War Office, "on the distinct understanding that they are to afford information as to facts, and that any opinions given by them are to be taken as those of individuals, and not as expressing the judgment of the Board of Admiralty."

9. On this understanding a Committee was assembled entitled the "Landing-places Committee," with Vice-Admiral Colomb as Chairman; the military members were Colonels Grove and Salmond; the naval, Captains Fawkes and Prince Louis of Battenberg. The Committee was instructed by the Secretary of State for War to examine particular invasions under the hypothesis that the enemy had ten days, twenty-one days, or six weeks available for preparation, not counting anterior preparations, which could be made without attracting serious attention in this country.

This is not
very clearly
expressed.—R.
August 19, 1901.

The Committee was specifically precluded by the Secretary of State for War from considering generally the risks of invasion to which the United Kingdom is liable. Yet even on these narrowed issues, there was a marked divergence in opinion between the naval and military members.

The naval members thought that, "even supposing the British Navy did not exist, ten days is too short a time within which to begin and complete the invasion of this country with 100,000 men." They were of the opinion that at least ever since the Crimean War the naval defences of these islands have "been such as to forbid the contemplation of invasion by the French, until they have been completely destroyed, and that the strength of the naval defence would grow by the prolongation of the notice much faster than the military attack, and that the French must be quite aware of the fact."

On the other hand, the military members came to the conclusion that "ten days marks the bare limit of time within which the active preparation for invasion and the invasion itself could be accomplished. If the invader had fourteen days instead of ten at command, his chance of success would be far from a bad one. . . . With twenty-one days at command, the enterprise is not only practicable, but easy."

Both naval and military members endeavoured to justify their divergent views in carefully-prepared separate memoranda, which were attached to the Committee's Report. The Report was printed by the War Office two years later, but it does not appear to have been referred to the Admiralty for any expression of opinion.

10. The upshot, therefore, of this correspondence and conference between the two Departments responsible for the defence of the Empire appears to be that the Admiralty steadily maintained the opinion that, in view of the strength of our Navy, the invasion of the United Kingdom in force was so much beyond the bounds of reasonable probability as not to be worth seriously considering. The War Office admitted the improbability, but insisted on the necessity for consideration.

In the conference, the military members considered that with twenty-one days' command of the Channel, invasion would be an easy enterprise; the naval members were not prepared even to admit this, except with the proviso that the British Navy must have been completely destroyed.

11. Of these two very divergent views, the War Office has adhered to its own in the scheme for the general defence of the United Kingdom. The main outlines of this scheme were, as stated in paragraph 7, drawn up and accepted by the military authorities before any consultation with the Admiralty had taken place, and have since remained unchanged, notwithstanding the Admiralty's expression of opinion. These main outlines comprise:—

(a.) The allotment of sufficient local garrisons to the naval bases and great commercial ports to ensure their defence in the temporary absence of His Majesty's fleet; (with this part of the War Office's policy the Admiralty have always been in accord).

(b.) The organization of all available regular troops into a mobile army, to be concentrated in the southern portion of England, leaving only a small nucleus of regulars in Ireland.

(c.) The concentration of all Volunteer troops not required for (a) to occupy selected positions for the defence of London.

In the original conception of the scheme, in 1888, the Regulars, Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteer troops available in the United Kingdom were allotted as follows:—

(*Vide* Memorandum by Colonel J. Ardagh, Assistant Adjutant-General, on the Mobilization of the Regular and Auxiliary Forces for Home Defence, dated the 17th April, 1888.)

ALLOTMENT of Troops for Home Defences in 1888.

A.—Garrisons of Defended Ports and Ireland.

	Infantry Battalions.	Cavalry Regiments.	Artillery.	
			Field Batteries.	Garrison Batteries.
Regulars	20	3	5	39
Militia	112	204
Yeomanry	3
Volunteers	97	40 (corps)
Total	229	6	5	243

B.—Mobile Army.

Regulars	59	18	48	..
Militia	22
Yeomanry	24
Total	81	42	48	..

C.—Troops for Defence of London.

Yeomanry	11
Volunteers	113	3	..	18 (corps)
Total	113	14	..	18 (corps)

These London Defence troops were primarily organized in 18 brigades, but were ultimately to be formed into nine divisions.

11. This distribution has been since considerably modified, and, immediately prior to the outbreak of war in South Africa, stood as follows:—

ALLOTMENT of Troops for Home Defence in 1899.

A.—War Garrisons for Defended Ports of United Kingdom.

Mobilization
Tables, &c.

	Infantry Battalions.	Cavalry Squadrons.	R. E. Units.	Artillery.	
				Companies and Position Batteries.	Field Batteries.
Regulars	2	..	15	43	..
Militia	102	..	19	192	..
Yeomanry	66
Volunteers	75	..	80	35½ 14	2
Total	179	66	114	605½	2

The nominal strength of the above war garrisons in 1899 was, approximately, 217,000, all ranks.

B.—*Mobile Army.*

	Infantry.		Cavalry Squadrons.	Artillery Batteries.		R.E. Units.
	Battalions.	Mounted.		R.H.A.	R.A.	
	Regulars	75	8	54	10	45
Volunteers	1

Or, a total of 108,777, all ranks.

C.—*Troops for Defence of London.*

				Infantry Battalions.	Engineer Companies.	Position Batteries.
Volunteers	129	44	88

The approximate strength of this force would be 143,000, all ranks.

Under the allotment of 1899, therefore, an aggregate of 383 battalions of infantry, 8 companies of mounted infantry, 120 squadrons of cavalry, 183 engineer units, 10 batteries horse artillery, 47 batteries field artillery, 102 batteries of position, and 591½ companies of garrison artillery. The numerical strength of the whole force thus assigned for home defence, on mobilization, would be, in round numbers, 470,000 of all ranks.

In addition to this force, to which definite duties have been assigned, there are shown in the Mobilization Tables of 1899 a reserve of unallotted units (including 28 battalions of Militia and 44 squadrons of Yeomanry) of a total aggregate strength of about 40,000. Thus, under the defence arrangements of 1899, the home army absorbed over half a million of men, exclusive of recruits and surplus reservists, who would be concentrated at depôts.

Of this very large force, only about 120,000 men were regulars; in other words, less than 25 per cent. of the whole half a million was available for offensive purposes beyond the shores of the United Kingdom.

This statement must, however, be somewhat modified by the fact that the actual establishment of all regular troops stationed in the United Kingdom was 147,328, and that, in addition to these numbers, must be reckoned the men of the Army Reserve and men of the old Militia Reserve. But neither of these classes of reserves appears to swell the strength of the force available for offensive operations; they serve but to raise the strength of the cadres up to war establishments, to replace men too young, or physically unfit, for foreign service, and to act as a reserve to make good wastage in the field. In these ways the reserve is of very great value, but it would be clearly a misrepresentation to count it as a numerical addition to the strength of the three Army Corps of regular troops, and it may be concluded that these three Army Corps were, in 1899, our only troops organized and available for offence.

12. The following extracts from Army Estimates show that the estimates of the current year have made a still further large increase in the establishments of the forces, maintained only for home defence, and not liable in war, except as a voluntary act, to service outside the United Kingdom. The figures in brackets give the actual strength of each force on the 1st January of the financial year referred to. The old Militia Reserve and the Special Service section of the Militia have been excluded from the first column, both having been liable to foreign service in war.

* Changes have recently been made in War Establishments, which with "excess numbers" will raise the strength of three Army Corps and four Cavalry Brigades to 137,336, all ranks.

ESTABLISHMENTS.

Year.	Militia (Channel Islands and United Kingdom), exclusive of old Militia Reserve and Special Service Section.	New Militia Reserve.	Yeomanry.	Volunteers.	Total.
1898-99 ..	106,489 (84,681)	Nil.	11,891 (10,207)	263,963 (231,624)	382,343
1899-1900 ..	102,568 (78,752)	Nil.	11,891 (10,114)	264,833 (230,785)	379,292
1900-1901 ..	106,506 (73,526)	Nil.	11,907 (8,657)	265,061 (277,900)	383,474
1901-1902 ..	134,810	50,000	35,000	375,000	594,810

The purely defensive forces not liable to service beyond the United Kingdom in time of war have, therefore, been increased in establishments this year by 211,346 men. This great increase is due to—

- (a.) The abolition of the old Militia Reserve and Special Service section.
- (b.) The creation of a new Militia Reserve, liable only to home service in time of war.
- (c.) The increase of the Yeomanry by 23,000.
- (d.) The increase of the Volunteers by 110,000.

Concurrently with this increase, it has been decided to organize three Army Corps, which would be available only for home defence; this decision will leave intact in the United Kingdom, after the departure on foreign service of the three offensive Army Corps, the complete organizations of a mobile army, of garrisons for defended ports, and of troops for the defence of London, assigned for home defence under the 1899 allotment. The total strength of these forces under the current estimates will, *exclusive* of the three Army Corps of Regulars, exceed by 100,000 men their strength in 1899, which was then *inclusive* of the three regular Army Corps.

If it may be presumed that, under normal conditions, there will be, at the outbreak of a great war, three Army Corps of regular troops at home (and the current estimates make this assumption), the troops actually available, at the outset, for home defence would be about 700,000 men, but of these 594,810 would not be available for any offensive action across the seas, unless they volunteered for such service.

In making this estimate, army reservists, recruits, and men physically unfit for foreign service have been again excluded, for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph.

13. Having thus examined the establishments of the forces which the State proposes to maintain for the defence of the United Kingdom, and the general outline of their distribution, we may now proceed to consider whether these forces and the arrangements made are inadequate, adequate, or excessive, as compared to the actual strategic requirements of the problem of home defence.

The various forms of attack to which the United Kingdom may possibly be exposed in the event of war with a Maritime Power may be classified under two main heads:—

- (A.) Attacks with a local objective.
- (B.) Invasion in force, with a view to the subjugation of the whole kingdom.

The attacks which fall under heading (A) have recently been examined in detail in a "conference between Admiralty and War Office representatives to consider the strategic conditions governing the coast defence of the United Kingdom in war, as affected by naval considerations." The report of this Conference, dated the 18th December, 1900, has been approved by both Admiralty and War Office (see War Office letter 266/490, dated the 11th March, 1901, and Admiralty letter M/0159, dated the 25th March, 1901), and its conclusions may, therefore, be accepted as authoritative.

The report sub-divides this form of attack under three heads:—

- (I.) Naval attack upon defended ports.
- (II.) Raids on other places along the coast, for the purpose of doing damage, interfering with communications, &c.
- (III.) The landing of hostile forces and arms in Ireland, in the hope of exciting insurrection or internal disturbances.

The Conference further laid down certain general principles as to the probable strength of these different forms of attack. The following is a summary of the most important of these principles:—

- Para. 3 of Report. (a.) "It is a fundamental principle of Admiralty policy that sufficient force shall at all times be maintained in home waters to ensure the command of those seas, and in no other way than by defeat can our naval force be unable to meet the enemy at sea."
- Para. 6. (b.) "So long as our fleet retains command of the sea, determined naval attack on our southern defended ports is highly improbable, while the simultaneous landing of a force to assist in such an attack is still more unlikely."
- Para. 9. (c.) "The case of the Channel Islands, however, is different. . . . Each of the three large islands should be prepared to resist the attack by a landing force of, say, 2,000 men."
- Para. 8. (d.) "As to our defended ports other than the southern," it is not possible to ensure that a hostile squadron may not evade our squadrons for a short time; "but if the squadron is accompanied by a land force, it is unlikely to attack one of our defended ports;" "it is highly improbable that a landing force of any size, even if it were able to disembark on our coasts, would be able to embark again unmolested by our ships;" "except, therefore, in cases such as the Tyne and Ireland, where the object to be gained might be held to compensate for the loss of the troops landed, it is hardly probable that any attempt would be made to land."
- Para. 11. (e.) "The force which might be landed to destroy the Elswick works and shipbuilding yards on the Tyne, or to raise an insurrection in Ireland, would probably not exceed 5,000 men. The latter is an enterprise "not unlikely to form part of hostile plans of campaign in the immediate future."
- Para. 14. (f.) "For raids along the coast, other than at defended ports or in Ireland, "it will be sufficient to provide against the attack of 2,000 men."
- Para. 12. (g.) "Torpedo-boat attack at night is "the most probable form of attack in the early stages of war, and the most dangerous to us."
- Paras. 15 and 16

14. A comparison of these general principles with the detailed tables of the garrisons allotted for the defence of home ports and as local mobile columns to meet raids leads to the conclusion that, except in the case of Ireland and the Tyne, the War Office have hitherto somewhat exaggerated the strength of the attack to which these ports are liable in time of war with a Maritime Power, and that certain of the larger garrisons may be somewhat reduced with safety. On the other hand, the question of a hostile landing in Ireland to raise an insurrection is not seriously faced in the existing defence schemes; possibly, too, some increase may be necessary in the Tyne defence garrison.

A War Office Committee has been appointed to examine in detail the whole of the coast defence garrisons in the light of the general principles laid down at the Conference; it would be out of place here to touch further on the matter, but it would seem probable that the aggregate strength of the total force needed for such special duty, at the outbreak of war, will certainly not exceed that at present assigned, and it may even be found possible to make some reduction. Further, too, it is to be noted that the strength fixed for these garrisons at the outbreak of war will be the maximum strength needed in the first stage of the war, when liability to such attack will be greatest; in subsequent stages, when the enemy's fleet has been destroyed or driven off the seas, the possibility of serious attack on our home-defended ports will greatly diminish or almost entirely disappear. Some portion, therefore, even of the troops allotted to this garrison duty may not be needed for that duty throughout the war, and it would seem desirable that the conditions under which a portion of these troops serve and are organized should be such as to make them available for offensive operations, if and when they can be released from garrison duty.

15. Turning now to the troops allotted to the special duty of repelling an invasion in force, we find that with the establishments fixed in the annual estimates, after providing for all the coast garrisons, nearly 500,000 men will remain over for this duty. Is this

force inadequate, adequate, or excessive, having regard to the probable strength of the attack which it may have to meet?

It is probably inadequate in numbers, and certainly inadequate in organization and efficiency, to meet the enormous force of regular troops which France could pour into this country, if we permanently lost the command of the Channel. But the country has deliberately and rightly decided to maintain such a navy as will make such a loss of command impossible, and so long as that policy is adhered to, it would be folly to lay upon the country the financial burden of an enormous home army, adapted only to meet a contingency which will not arise, and unavailable for the probable needs of the Empire. Moreover, the conditions of the food supply of the nation are such that it is absolutely certain that if we lose sea command, however large a home army we maintain, we shall be starved into surrender, without the landing of a single French soldier on our shores.

It would appear, however, from the Memorandum prepared by the military members of the Landing-places Committee of 1892, already referred to, that the arrangements made to repel invasion on a large scale are based on the limited hypothesis that the French have twenty-one days free from serious interference by our Navy, and that in that time they could land three to four Army Corps. This hypothesis rested on the assumption that "circumstances may occur which will prevent any effective interference by our Navy with the invading flotilla." The military members admitted that the Admiralty repudiated any such assumption, but they supported it by quoting the opinion of the Royal Commission of 1859, that the Navy alone was insufficient to repel invasion, and they further urged that the assumption was fully warranted by public opinion on the subject, and by the continuous policy of the War Office in raising and maintaining the Volunteer Force.

The Admiralty, however, in 1892, absolutely refused to accept this hypothesis as worth serious consideration; and general principles (a) and (b) (quoted in paragraph 13 above), as laid down by the Conference of the beginning of this year, would certainly seem quite inconsistent with any such hypothesis; these general principles have been approved by both Admiralty and War Office, and this approval appears to close the controversy between the two Departments.

16. Having regard to these facts, it seems difficult to contend that, having provided the garrisons necessary for "coast defence," it is necessary to maintain in this country throughout a war with a Maritime Power an additional 500,000 men solely for the possibility of meeting an invasion in force.

Moreover, it seems quite clear, that, even if we reject the Admiralty view as to the uselessness of seriously considering the possibility of such a contingency, its probability will very greatly diminish, and almost disappear, as soon as the enemy's squadrons have been destroyed or chased into port and blockaded.

This fact was, no doubt, not lost sight of in the arrangements under which, out of our home army of 700,000, three Army Corps and four cavalry brigades will be organized for offensive action across the seas; but the proportion thus available for striking a blow at the enemy is undoubtedly too small.

It cannot be ignored, however, that, even after our sea supremacy had been established, there would be considerable public anxiety, if this country were denuded of all troops except those needed as garrisons of the defended ports and Ireland; but it must be remembered that at the very first sign of war with France the military spirit of this country would be greatly roused, and the national home defence force, whatever form or organization it may take in the future, would be rapidly swelled by a great influx of the best of the manhood of the country. Although, from lack of training, this increase could not be relied on, in a military sense, to resist invasion, yet, as that contingency need not be seriously considered when sea supremacy has been established, the addition to our forces thus attained may be reckoned on as sufficing to allay the national anxiety, and thus setting free the offensive force.

During the first stage of war, and until sea supremacy has been established, offensive action will be impracticable, as the Admiralty have refused to escort military transports during that period. The offensive force will, therefore, be in the United Kingdom and available to repel invasion, so long as there is a probability of an attempt being made at serious invasion.*

* Is it not possible that the offensive force, or a portion of it, may have been dispatched on service before an invasion was threatened? Our quarrel might, in the first instance, be with Russia, necessitating troops being sent to India, and while they were employed there France might attempt an invasion.—R.

See p. 40. After providing for India, we should have at home three Army Corps, one cavalry division, and one brigade of mounted infantry, in addition to home defensive force.—W. G. N. *September 20, 1901,*

For these reasons it is submitted that, having regard to the urgent needs of the Empire for troops available in war for service beyond the seas—needs which will be dealt with later—the numerical strength of the purely defensive portion of the military forces which will be available only for home defence in war need not be maintained at any higher figure than 350,000 men, including in that number the troops ear-marked as garrisons for home-defended ports and Ireland. This number is, of course, entirely exclusive of depôts for the offensive force, and of the reserves needed to keep that force up to strength after it has entered on the campaign.

A force of this strength might be organized so as to comprise a mobile army of three Army Corps, in addition to the stationary garrisons of defended ports, and to the force needed for Ireland. It would allow the conversion into offensive troops of about 245,000 out of the 594,000 men provided by the present establishments for purely defensive duties.

(B.)—DEFENCE OF THE BRITISH COLONIES AND PROTECTORATES.

17. Colonial defence is, in one important respect, on a more satisfactory footing than home defence, in that the policy adopted rests on certain definite principles as to which both Admiralty and War Office have for many years been in accord.

These principles are clearly enunciated in the following extract from a Memorandum drawn up by the Colonial Defence Committee, dated the 19th May, 1896, for the guidance of the Governments of self-governing Colonies:—

“The maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial defence against attack over the sea. This is the determining factor in shaping the whole defensive policy of the Empire, and is fully recognized by the Admiralty, who have accepted the responsibility of protecting all British territory abroad from organized invasion from the sea. To fulfil this great charge they claim the absolute power of disposing their forces in the manner they consider most certain to insure success, and object to limit the action of any part of them to the immediate neighbourhood of places which they consider may be more effectively protected by operations at a distance.

“It is recognized, however, that His Majesty’s ships engaged in hunting out and destroying the squadrons of an enemy may not be in a position to prevent the predatory raids of hostile cruisers on British ports. The strength of such an attack will vary in the different parts of the world, according to the strengths of possibly hostile navies, the proximity of their bases, and the troops that are, or could easily be, brought there in anticipation of war. It also varies from time to time with changing political combinations. But it is in the highest degree improbable that the raiding attack would be made by more than a few ships, nor could it have any permanent effect, unless troops could be landed. In no case could a greater force than a few thousand men be collected and conveyed without such arrangements and preparations as would bring the operations under the category of those which the Navy has undertaken to prevent.”

These statements were accepted by both War Office and Admiralty, and have been embodied in substance in the “Instructions on Defence Matters” issued by the Admiralty in May last. In the “General Principles” set forth in these instructions it is distinctly stated that “upon the Admiralty rests the responsibility of providing for the protection of all English territory at home and abroad against organized attack by sea.”

18. The garrisons of all defended ports throughout the world have, with one exception, been fixed in accordance with these principles. It is, moreover, recognized that changes in the strategic conditions have from time to time affected the nature of the attack to which certain defended ports are liable; and whenever circumstances appear to have enhanced the gravity of such attack, an increase of the approved garrison of the port and the standard of its defence is considered and, as a rule, adopted. Amongst the defended ports whose approved garrisons have in recent years been thus materially increased may be mentioned Bermuda, Sierra Leone, Mauritius, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

A further increase in the Hong Kong garrison is now under the consideration of the War Office; but this increase may, it is hoped, be effected by the transfer of the Chinese regiment from Wei-hai-Wei to Hong Kong—a step which will not involve any augmentation in the total number of troops allotted for colonial garrison duty.*

* It is now proposed to retain a portion of the Chinese Regiment at Wei-hai-Wei, and to add a third Indian battalion to the approved garrison of Hong Kong.—E. A. January 16, 1903.

19. The exception referred to in paragraph 18 is Malta. That very important naval base has hitherto not been held to be protected by the Navy from organized attack by sea, but it is expressly contemplated in its defence scheme that the fortress is liable to the deliberate attack of a hostile fleet, and to siege by an expeditionary force landed outside the defences on the north-west side of the island. The Governor has, however, recently stated that the present garrison is, in his opinion, insufficient to repel attacks of this nature, and has stated that to insure safety it should be increased by a brigade of infantry.

It is obvious, however, that this increase would be unnecessary, if the doctrine that the Navy is responsible for the protection of all British territory at home and abroad from organized attack by sea can be applied to Malta. It has been proposed on another paper that His Majesty's Government should be moved to consider whether such application is permissible and practicable.*

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Malta
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20. Defended ports are, for strategical purposes, arranged in five classes:—

Admiralty
instructions on
Defence matters

(1.) *Principal Naval Bases*—*i.e.*, those ports where His Majesty's ships can be repaired in all respects, and replenished with men, ammunition, and stores from depôts. The ports which come under this category are Gibraltar, Malta, Bermuda, and Halifax.

(2.) *Naval Bases*—*i.e.*, those where minor repairs can be effected, and only certain stores (including ammunition) can be obtained. The colonial ports which come under this category are Hong Kong, Sydney, Cape Town, Simon's Bay, Esquimalt, Jamaica, and Trincomalee. The Indian port of Bombay also belongs to this class.

(3.) *Secondary Naval Bases*—*i.e.*, suitably fortified ports where His Majesty's ships can replenish ammunition and stores sent thither by rail or freight. These include Melbourne, Auckland (New Zealand), Sierra Leone, Mauritius, Singapore, and St. Lucia. The Indian port of Aden also comes in this class.

(4.) *Coaling Stations, Ports of Refuge, or Defended Commercial Ports*.—These include Ascension, St. Helena, Durban, Hobart, Wellington (New Zealand), Port Lyttleton (New Zealand), Otago Harbour (New Zealand), Albany, Adelaide, Wollongong, Newcastle (New South Wales), Brisbane, Townsville, Thursday Island, Colombo, Quebec, and Georgetown (British Guiana). The following Indian ports are also so classified: Rangoon, Madras, Calcutta, and Karachi:—

21. Exclusive, therefore, of the home-defended ports which have been already considered, there are forty defended ports to be garrisoned abroad. Of these—

(a.) Six are garrisoned by troops under the Government of India.

(b.) One (Ascension) is garrisoned by the Navy.

(c.) Seventeen are garrisoned entirely by local forces provided by Colonial Governments, who pay also for the defences.

(d.) Sixteen are garrisoned either solely by Imperial troops, or partly by Imperial troops and partly by local forces provided by the Colonial Governments.

Of these classes (a) will be considered later in dealing with the defence of India; class (b) does not need consideration in this paper; as to class (c), it will suffice for the moment to note that the garrisons are sufficient, and that in both Australia and New Zealand there is a considerable margin, and in Canada a very large margin, of troops left available for other purposes, after deducting from the strength of the local forces the actual garrisons needed for their defended ports.

22. The following are the troops included in the approved garrisons of class (d), *i.e.*, the colonial ports garrisoned wholly by Imperial troops, or partly by Imperial and partly by colonial troops:—

* Since the above was written, correspondence with the Admiralty as to the strategic position in the Mediterranean has tended to the conclusion that Malta is sufficiently garrisoned; but the General Officer Commanding at Malta having subsequently expressed further doubt on the point, his representations have been referred to the Admiralty for further consideration.—E. A. January 16, 1903.

	Imperial.						Colonial.	
	British Regulars.		Native Regulars.		Local Militia and Volunteers (Imperial).		Companies.	Men.
	Companies.	Men.	Companies.	Men.	Companies.	Men.		
Garrison Artillery: 73 Companies or 12,962 men ..	37	8,147	20	2,321	3	365	13	2,129
Engineers: 27 Companies or 2,512 men ..	17	1,750	7	626	2	106	1	30
	Battalions.	Men.	Battalions.	Men.	Battalions.	Men.	Corps.	Men.
Infantry: 42 $\frac{1}{4}$ Battalions or 37,544 men ..	20	20,240	8 $\frac{3}{4}$	9,049	3	2,581	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	5,674
Staff and Departments	1,385	249
Total	31,522	..	11,996	..	3,052	..	8,082

The total number of troops, therefore, allotted in war for the defence of colonial ports (falling within this class) is 54,652, all ranks, of whom 46,630 are provided by the War Office.

There appears to be no occasion for anxiety as to the adequacy of these garrisons, excepting only the case of Malta. The Malta garrison would be sufficient, if the Admiralty are prepared to guarantee that fortress against organized attack by sea. If they are unable to do this, four more battalions should be added to the Malta garrison.

23. It has long been an accepted principle that the garrisons of defended ports abroad should in all respects be maintained at their full war strength in peace time. Modern wars break out with but little warning. Moreover, the Admiralty decline absolutely the responsibility of escorting military transports during the first phase of a war with a Maritime Power, when our fleets will be fully occupied in fulfilling their primary duty of seeking out and fighting the enemy's ships. A fortress, therefore, which has been denuded, as Malta was recently denuded, of 25 per cent. of its infantry, may be caught by a sudden outbreak of war with a garrison quite inadequate to insure its safety.

For these reasons, although this principle has been in other cases beside Malta unavoidably entrenched on during the present war in South Africa, it cannot be too fully realized that every breach of it involves a very definite risk, which may entail the most serious consequences. It is essential, therefore, that the future organization of the Army should be such as to insure a stringent observance of this rule, and that the garrisons of defended ports should be regarded as the irreducible minimum to be maintained at the station both in peace and war, and should be never drawn on as a reserve available for operations elsewhere.

It follows, therefore, that the troops allotted to such garrisons must be considered as ear-marked, and as available for such garrison duty only, unless relieved by other units of equal strength.

24. The "approved garrisons" stated in paragraph 22 are sufficient only to defend the "defended ports" of our Colonies against attack over the sea under the condition of our maintaining general sea supremacy. They do not provide against land attacks, which, if we may assume that we are assured of the neutrality of the United States, need not, so far as the Colonies are concerned, be seriously considered in our strategic plans of defence in a war against France and Russia. To this general rule, however, there is one exception, that of the British possessions in West Africa. All these possessions have frontiers coterminous with those of French possessions, and France maintains in West Africa a total force of 2,922 Europeans and 10,908 natives. Offensive action by these troops is probable, but can be sufficiently dealt with by the West African Frontier Force—a force paid for by the various Colonies and administered by the Colonial Office—which will in future have an establishment of about 250 Europeans and

about 8,000 natives.* Moreover, the most probable objective of any French attack of this nature would be the naval base of Sierra Leone, and that fortress has an Imperial garrison of a strength fixed avowedly with the object of repelling land attack. The best defence, however, against French land attacks in West Africa will be the assumption of the offensive against the French naval base of Dakar and the occupation of the French Colony of Dahomey. These are points which will be dealt with later. It suffices here to note that Sierra Leone has a garrison which will make it reasonably secure against land attack, and that the other British possessions in West Africa have a local force sufficient for their defence.

25. But besides the force needed to repel attack by land and sea, the maintenance of law and order throughout the Empire is a duty which must not be lost sight of in considering the needs of the Empire in a time of a great war. Of all our Colonies, those in Africa are alone likely to give cause for any anxiety under this head. In both East and West Africa not a year passes without at least one small war, undertaken to restore order in His Majesty's dominions. There have, for instance, been four such campaigns in Africa during the past twelve months, and we cannot expect to be exempt from such additions to our anxieties during a great war with a Maritime Power. For many years both West and East Africa relied on the Army at home or in India for assistance to meet such contingencies; but it is now recognized that this policy was a cause of much unnecessary expenditure and of many other inconveniences. The local forces of West Africa have, therefore, been lately strengthened and reorganized with a view to their being sufficient for local needs.

A similar reorganization of the East African forces is now under the consideration of His Majesty's Government, and, when accomplished, neither East nor West Africa is likely to have urgent need of reinforcements during a war with France and Russia.

South Africa alone remains to be considered. The "approved" colonial garrisons set forth in paragraph 22 include only the garrison necessary to defend Cape Town and Simon's Town from the raiding attack of cruisers. This garrison is fixed at 2,707, all ranks, exclusive of local troops.

Durban is garrisoned in war by the colonial forces of Natal, but it is evident that for some years at least, until Dutch and English have settled down together in a federated South Africa, the presence of a considerable force of Imperial troops will be necessary in the country, in addition to the garrison of Cape Town. It is impossible at the present moment to fix with any exactitude at what strength it will be found necessary to maintain that force. It would seem unnecessary to detain in South Africa troops of such a strength as to deal without other assistance with the improbable contingency of a general rising of the Dutch. It may suffice, if we have in the country a force sufficient to preserve order, to nip at once in the bud any small rising, and, in the event of a general rebellion, to protect the larger towns and hold at least one of the railways, until reinforcements can arrive from England. The establishment contemplated in Army Estimates (1901-1902) of only 15,185 men does not appear adequate to these duties; but, looking to the various local forces, such as the South African Constabulary and the Cape and Natal colonial forces, which will be available to assist the Imperial troops, it may be roughly conjectured, for the purposes of this Memorandum, that, when the war has terminated, the following Imperial force would suffice to garrison the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal:—

	All Ranks.
1 Cavalry Brigade	2,497
18 Battalions of Infantry†	18,144
2 Brigade Divisions Artillery‡	1,060
2 Field Companies R.E.	424
2 Troops Bridging Battalion R.E.	426
1 Company Telegraph Battalion	244
Staff	171
Departmental (say)	1,500
Total	24,466

* This now requires some modification. The rapid increase in the areas in West Africa under effective occupation renders it doubtful, if the existing establishments of the West Africa Frontier Force suffice to ensure safety.—E. A. *January 16, 1903.*

† A considerable number of mounted infantry would certainly be required, composed either of British or Colonials, or both.—R.

‡ One or two heavy batteries will also be needed in South Africa for some little time to come.—R.

Including the Cape Town garrison, there would therefore be a total of 27,173 Imperial troops in South Africa,* or, with the South African Constabulary, a total of about 35,000 men, exclusive of the local defence forces of Cape Colony, Natal, and Southern Rhodesia, and of local troops at Johannesburg. This should suffice to insure freedom from undue anxiety.

In time, the necessity for so large an Imperial garrison in South Africa will pass away. It may even be hoped that a loyal South African Commonwealth will, in another generation, contribute towards the defence of the Empire as a whole; but for the moment it would be impracticable to discuss dreams of the political future. We must face the facts of the present, however disagreeable, and the continuance of a considerable body of troops in South Africa for some years after the war appears to be inevitable.

26. It may safely be assumed that the Colonies will, at least, continue to bear the same proportion of the burden of Imperial defence as heretofore. With this assumption it may be concluded, from what has been already stated, that the following is the total strength of Imperial troops needed for Colonial defence :—

				British Troops.	Native Troops and Auxiliaries maintained by the War Office.
Defended Ports	31,522	15,048
South Africa..	24,466	Nil.
Total	55,988	15,048

The various units needed to maintain the above strength will be :—

BRITISH TROOPS.

				Defended Ports.	South Africa.	Total.
Cavalry Regiments	4	4
R.A. {	Field Batteries	6	6
	Garrison Companies	37	..	37
R.E. {	Field	2	2
	Fortress	13	..	13
	Pontoon Troops	2	2
	Telegraph Division	1	1
	S.M. Companies	4	..	4
Infantry Battalions	20	18	38

NATIVE TROOPS

(including Indian Battalions lent by India)

R.A.—Garrison Companies	23	..	23
R.E. {	Fortress	1	..	1
	S.M.	..	{	5 companies and 3 detachments	..	{ 5 companies and 3 detachments.
Infantry Battalions	12	..	12

All these troops must be kept at full strength in peace time at their respective stations.

The above calculations are subject to the reservation as to the case of Malta made in paragraph 23.

* It will be observed that this forecast agrees exactly with the proposals of Mr. Chamberlain's telegram of the 10th January, 1903.—E. A. January 16, 1903.

(C.)—DEFENCE OF EGYPT.

27. No scheme for the defence of Egypt in a war with a Maritime Power has yet been approved, and more than one important point of policy connected with this defence problem has still to be decided by His Majesty's Government. The matter, however, is discussed at length in another paper recently submitted to the Commander-in-chief, and it will suffice here, therefore, to note briefly the following conclusions arrived at as regards the number of troops needed :—

(a.) During the first phase of a war with Russia and France in alliance against Great Britain, and until we had acquired command of the Eastern Mediterranean waters, Egypt would appear to be liable to an attack by sea :—

(i.) Of an expeditionary force of 25,000 men intended to occupy the country.
 (ii.) Of a raiding force of 4,500 to 5,000 men intended to block the Canal; the latter form of attack is a probable contingency, having regard to the existing strategical conditions. It is not known whether the Admiralty are in a position to guarantee Egypt against (i).

(b.) The establishments of the British garrison of Egypt comprise :—

- 1 Cavalry Regiment.
- 1 Field Battery.
- 1 Garrison Company R.A.
- 1 " " Malta Artillery.
- 1 Fortress Company R.E.
- 4 Infantry Battalions.

The above, with staff and departmental details, give an establishment of 5,432, all ranks.

The actual strength on the 1st May last (A.G.'s Return) was 4,239 of all ranks, the garrison being one battalion short.

The Egyptian Army comprises :—

- 5 Squadrons Cavalry.
- 6 Companies Camelry.
- 6 Field Batteries.
- 3 Companies Garrison Artillery.
- 9 Egyptian Battalions.
- 7 Soudanese Battalions.

The total effective strength may be reckoned at 13,000 men. Considerable doubt is felt whether the Egyptian Army would be loyal to us in the case of attack by French and Russian troops; but it is thought that we should have a better hold on them by associating them with British troops and using them, rather than by leaving them isolated and unemployed. The entire Egyptian Army, with the exception of a small garrison at Cairo, is, however, permanently stationed in the south, and none would be available under seven days after an order had been issued for their withdrawal to Upper Egypt.

(c.) In the contingency of war with Russia and France, all troops east of Suez, including Australian troops, that could be spared from the local defence of coaling stations, &c., would be needed for the defence of India (*vide* paragraph 30 below). Egypt must therefore look westward, not eastward, for help, if she should need help. The basis of the scheme of defence must, therefore, be: (1) the protection of the Canal, and (2) the retention of Port Said and Alexandria as long as practicable, so as to keep the ports open for reinforcements.

(d.) The contingency of a raiding attack of 5,000 men may be expected in the first week of the war, but it is unlikely that we should know beforehand whether the objective of such attack would be Port Said or Alexandria. British troops would alone be available to repulse a sudden attack of this nature, and these troops must be divided, so as to hold both Alexandria and Port Said. The presence of some British troops in Cairo would also, for political reasons, be most desirable.

(e.) It is concluded, therefore, that the British garrison provided for Egypt in the present Estimates, including the British battalion which, though provided in the Estimates, has not yet been sent, is insufficient for defence purposes, having regard to the probable isolation of Egypt during the opening phase of a war with a Maritime Power.

It is considered that, unless Alexandria or Port Saïd can be fortified, the British garrison of Egypt should be increased permanently by—

- 1 Cavalry Regiment.
- 6 Field Batteries Artillery.
- 1 Field Company Royal Engineers.
- 2 Battalions Infantry.

The Suez Canal Convention probably presents insuperable political obstacles to the fortification of Port Saïd, although technically, as our acceptance of the terms of that Convention is subject to a reservation during our occupation of Egypt, we would seem empowered to erect any forts on Egyptian soil which are needed for the defence of Egypt. The Convention presents no difficulties as to the fortification of Alexandria, and if that port were placed in a thorough state of defence and if a local water supply could be provided, the cavalry regiment and three of the field batteries might be eliminated from the proposed augmentation of the garrison, provided only attack (2) is probable.*

As soon as we had obtained command of the Eastern Mediterranean the augmentation above proposed might perhaps be available for service elsewhere, but it is clear from the facts already stated that this increase in the garrison cannot safely be postponed until war breaks out, as by the time troops can be conveyed through the Mediterranean the danger to Egypt will have passed away, or Egypt will have fallen into the possession of our enemies. It is essential, therefore, that this augmentation should be present in Egypt at the moment war breaks out, and this can only be ensured by a permanent increase in the garrison.

28. It may be as well to point out that the conclusion arrived at in the preceding paragraph is not affected by the acceptance by the Admiralty of responsibility for repelling organized attack by sea, for in the general guarantee of all British dominions against organized attack by sea, the Admiralty specifically except from such guarantee the case of raids of "a few ships" carrying "a few thousand men" (*vide* paragraph 17 above), and it is against a raid of this nature that an adequate garrison will be needed in Egypt at the outbreak of war. With the present relative naval forces in the Mediterranean, there can be no doubt that it would be quite out of the power of the Admiralty to give any assurance that they would be able to protect Egypt from such raids during the first ten days of a war with France and Russia. It is, however, desirable to note that, if the Admiralty cannot guarantee Egypt against an organized attack of the nature stated in paragraph 27 (a) (i), *i.e.*, of an expeditionary force of 25,000 men, it is very improbable that we shall be able to hold Egypt in war unless we increase in peace its British garrison to at least 15,000 men.

In this, as in all other parts of our system of Imperial defence, sea supremacy is the basis of the whole matter. Any doubt as to the sufficiency of the Navy to ensure sea supremacy at once vitiates all our plans, and involves a situation in which, even with a very great increase in our land forces, it would be difficult and almost impracticable to prepare any really sound scheme for the defence of the Empire as a whole.

This fact is so obvious a truism that it would seem superfluous to refer to it in this paper, were it not that the Governor of Malta has recently stated that he feels some anxiety as to the sufficiency of the present strength of His Majesty's fleet in those waters. It is necessary, therefore, to point out that, unless this anxiety is groundless, the military garrisons of both Malta† and Egypt will need a material increase.

29. To sum up, therefore, if Alexandria can be fortified, the normal British garrison of Egypt should consist of—

* Lord Kitchener has since proposed that the garrison of Egypt should be augmented by three artillery units and four battalions, British or Soudanese. These proposals are under consideration.—E. A. *January 16, 1903.*

† A satisfactory assurance about Malta has lately been received from the Admiralty.—W. G. N. *October 11, 1901.*

						All Parks.
Cavalry	1 Regiment	..	488
Royal Artillery	..			} 3 Field Batteries 2 Garrison Companies	424
					..	388
Malta Artillery	1 „ Company	..	124
R.E.	1 Company	..	114
Infantry	6 Battalions	..	6,672
Departmental	Details (say)	..	400
Total	8,010

If Alexandria be not fortified, the above should be increased by 1 cavalry regiment and 3 field batteries, but one of the garrison companies may be omitted.

(D.)—THE DEFENCE OF INDIA.

30. The problem of the defence of India is dealt with at length in a Memorandum by Captain Peach, D.A.A.G., which is attached as Appendix I to this paper.

In Appendix II will be found a summary of decisions given and opinions expressed by the highest authorities, when this subject was last discussed between the Imperial and the Indian Governments. The conclusions arrived at in the Memorandum are:—

(1.) That under the conditions which now exist, the projects which have been formerly considered of assisting the defence of India by operations against Russia west of the Caspian, or viâ Tehran, or in the Far East, are impracticable.

(2.) That in a war with Russia a purely defensive attitude on the north-west frontier would be very disadvantageous, having regard to both political and strategical reasons.

(3.) That the minimum of offensive action, which would be consistent with the political and strategical conditions of the campaign, would be the occupation of the passes opposite Cabul with a containing force, and an advance by Southern Afghanistan.

(4.) That in the first month of the war Russia could at once move into Afghanistan 50,000 to 60,000 men, and that in four months this force might reach the strength of 200,000 men in the theatre of war, in which India would be directly concerned.

(5.) That in addition to these numbers the Afghan Army—a well-armed force of 100,000—must be reckoned as a doubtful factor, which may perhaps turn against us.

(6.) That with her normal garrison (part of which is now absent in South Africa and China) India could only place in the field on the north-west frontier:—

British troops	24,480
Indian native troops	50,550
“Imperial Service” troops (lacking British officers)	16,000
Total	91,030

The remainder of the Indian Army, amounting to about 125,000 effectives (not counting Volunteers and native military police and levies), would be detained in India as “obligatory garrisons,” and would not be available for frontier defence. These obligatory garrisons include the garrisons of the defended ports already enumerated (paragraphs 20–21), but they are, in a large measure, necessitated by the paramount obligation of guarding against a rising in India.

(7.) That India's troops being obviously insufficient for her own needs, it is idle to contemplate their being employed on any offensive expeditions external to her own theatre of war.

31. These conclusions, with one important exception, appear based on the highest authority, or, where not so based, to be supported by recent changes in strategic conditions, the facts of which are stated. The exception is the suggestion that the occupation of the passes opposite Cabul and an advance through Southern Afghanistan

should form the basis of our plan of campaign. This is not in agreement with Lord Roberts' Memorandum of the 8th June, 1891, which was submitted to Her Majesty's Government by the Government of India's despatch No. 180 of the 15th September, 1891 (W.O., No. 0149/1/569). In this Memorandum the Commander-in-chief laid down the supreme importance, whether for offensive or defensive operations, of the occupation of "the comparatively short alignment stretching from Cabul to Kandahar." The strategical importance of this position is such that its occupation would appear necessary, whether the consent of Afghanistan can or cannot be secured. With Afghanistan friendly, no diplomatic effort should be spared to obtain that consent; but if Afghanistan should finally refuse, or assume a definite hostile attitude, we must then be prepared to seize the Cabul-Kandahar alignment notwithstanding her opposition. It is therefore evident that the attitude of the Afghans is a very important factor in this difficult problem. If the Afghan army were definitely hostile to Russia, the difficulties of the latter would be so increased as to enable us at the outset to advance even with only our present available field army. If the Afghan army be against us, we should, at the end of four months, have opposing us in the field 300,000 men, and under such conditions it would appear madness to contemplate the possibility of acting on the offensive without very large reinforcements. Unfortunately, under existing political conditions, we are unlikely to be able to predict the attitude of the Afghans.

Lord Roberts and the Government of India, in their despatch above quoted, laid emphasis on the fact that our prestige would seriously suffer if we allowed Russia to invade Afghanistan without opposition, and that such loss of prestige would have grave consequences, not only with regard to our relations with the Afghans, but also in India itself. His Lordship, in his Memorandum, discussed in detail the force which would be needed to hold the Kandahar-Cabul alignment without attempting offensive operations beyond the Hindu Kush range, and he proved that the normal garrison of India, after deducting therefrom the "obligatory" garrisons, could not furnish a field army adequate for this duty without an immediate reinforcement of 30,000 British troops. These calculations did not, however, contemplate a hostile Afghanistan, and it is therefore clear that, with a view to that possibility, it will be unsafe to reckon that an addition of 30,000 men would suffice for all requirements. Moreover, it would be strategically unsound to be tied by lack of numbers to an absolutely defensive attitude on the Cabul-Kandahar line. The conclusion, therefore, that the present strength of the forces in India is inadequate for its defence in a war with Russia cannot be avoided.

32. As a solution of the grave difficulties which are thus presented, Captain Peach proposes :

(a.) That a force of 8,000 to 10,000 white police should be raised for duty in India—a measure which he estimates would set free for active operations about 30,000 of the "obligatory garrisons."

(b.) That the normal garrison of India should be increased by 30,000 British troops, the cost being met from Imperial funds.

These remedies would raise the total force to a strength of 150,000 men. This force cannot, however, be accepted as sufficient to deal with the contingency of the defence of India against a combined Russian-Afghan army 300,000 strong, which would also probably involve the rising of all the Mussulman tribes on the border. Even if we adopt a purely defensive plan of operations, the danger of which has been already pointed out, it would be unsafe to face the task with a much less number than 200,000 men.

33. Captain Peach's proposal that a military white police force, 10,000 strong, should be organized, presents *prima facie* certain advantages; composed, as it would be, of old soldiers, the establishment of such a force would not interfere with recruiting for the army, and would open up a new career for the soldier, after he has finished his period of service with his regiment. But such a force would clearly be an expensive one. It would entail a very large married establishment, and would involve a system of pensions and provision for invalided men and the families of those who died. The men, moreover, would have to be picked men of good character and a knowledge of Hindustani; their pay, therefore, must be high. But these objections might be deemed minor considerations if there were a fair prospect of the force fulfilling in a satisfactory manner the purpose for which it is proposed to create it. Unfortunately, it would seem more likely that the men would rapidly deteriorate, both physically and morally, and would be efficient neither as policemen nor as soldiers. The experiment does not, therefore, appear a desirable one to enter on.

34. We come, therefore, to the proposal to increase the Indian Army. It has been already pointed out that Lord Roberts, when Commander-in-chief in India in 1891, clearly proved that the Army in India is inadequate for its duties in war. This conclusion was endorsed by the despatch of the Government of India of the 15th September of that year, and it is remarkable that Lieutenant-General Sir H. Brackenbury signed this despatch, although that officer, when at the War Office in 1889, had held the opinion that "the present Army in India is sufficient for all the requirements of India at the present time" (*vide* Memoranda of Generals Brackenbury and Newmarch, dated the 19th August, 1889, forwarded to India Office by War Office letter No. 0149/1/564 of the 29th May, 1890, and quoted on p. 20 of Appendix II).

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The War Office did not contest the conclusion of the Government of India as to the inadequacy of the Indian Army, but, after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for India, the Secretary of State for War, in a letter addressed to the India Office on the 15th March, 1892, laid down the following general principles:—

Ibid.

"(1.) The question of the number of European troops required for the defence of India is primarily for the Government of India, subject to the approval of the home Government.

"(2.) The scheme for the defence of India must be based upon the troops actually under the control of the Government of India. No reserve for India, beyond the drafts necessary to complete the British units to Indian established strength, is maintained in this country.

"(3.) The home Army is maintained for the defence of the Empire (including India) wherever it may be threatened, and without consultation with the home Government no forward line of policy should be laid down in India which contemplates the necessity of reinforcements for India for its accomplishment."

To this letter the Indian Government replied (despatch No. 132, dated the 6th September, 1892), reiterating the opinion of Lord Roberts that an immediate reinforcement of 30,000 British troops would be needed in India to meet the contingency of war with Russia. They stated, however, that financial considerations did not permit of any increase in the Indian Army, and that, therefore, "the responsibility must rest with His Majesty's Government."

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The War Office, in their final reply (dated the 13th May, 1893), said, in substance, that—

(a.) If the occupation of Southern Afghanistan is necessary in war, India must keep up sufficient troops for that purpose.

(b.) India must not rely on the home Army, as "the employment of that portion not permanently allotted for the defence of selected positions will, in time of emergency, be directed by the Cabinet of the day."

An inter-Departmental Committee subsequently investigated in London how far the War Office was in a position to carry out the second principle laid down in War Office letter of the 19th March, 1892, *i.e.*, the despatch to India of the drafts necessary to keep the British units up to strength. The Committee reported (27th March, 1893) that drafts of 17,610 men would be needed for India during the first year of war. They pointed out that drafts preparing for India were borne on the home establishment, and would, therefore, be absorbed by a general home mobilization. They recommended, therefore, that these drafts should be supernumerary to the home establishment.

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The Secretary of State for War, however, declined to sanction this proposal.

This decision would seem to leave India not only without any assurance of reinforcements, but even without any certainty in war of the despatch of drafts from home.

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35. The correspondence then concluded, and thus left this grave question in a thoroughly unsatisfactory state. The general principle, that it is the duty of each subordinate Government of the Empire to provide, so far as its financial ability permits, sufficient troops for local defence is a thoroughly sound one, and should be steadily enforced; but, on the other hand, it is equally the duty of the Imperial Government to see that adequate provision is made for the defence of the Empire as a whole in a great war, and yet it is evident from this correspondence that the problem of the defence of India in a war with Russia and France has never been fully faced by the home Government; indeed, it must be admitted that Mr. Stanhope's scheme for the organization of the Army for war (*vide* Paper on the Requirements of the Army, dated 1st June, 1891), which only

allowed of the preparation of two Army Corps for service across the seas, and hampered the despatch of even these two corps by counting them as an integral portion of the force needed for the defence of the United Kingdom, clearly contemplated India being left, in the contingency of a great war, entirely dependent on her own resources, although the home Government had been repeatedly warned by the highest authority that those resources were quite inadequate. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to accept the loss of India, as an inevitable result of a war between this country and France and Russia, it is manifest that drastic measures are necessary to place this portion of our general scheme of Imperial defence on a safe footing.

36. What practical shape, then, should these measures take? The first step is obviously to provide the 30,000 additional men which Lord Roberts has shown to be absolutely needed to hold defensively the Kandahar-Cabul alignment. India's poverty in 1891 forced the Indian Government to ask the home authorities for an assurance that this force should be despatched as a reinforcement from England, but it needs no proof that these men should, if possible, be actually in India on the outbreak of war, for their presence in India would be of the greatest value, both strategical and political, in determining the attitude of Afghanistan and of the border tribes, and to insure internal tranquillity. If India must look across the seas for the reinforcement, its despatch would not be practicable until we attained sea command, and the delay which would be thus entailed might have very grave consequences. It is evident, therefore, that, if possible, the garrison of India should be permanently augmented. India's poverty prevented her from increasing her Army when this course was urged by the home Government in 1892, and it is even now suggested by Captain Peach that the necessary augmentation should be carried out at the expense of the home Government. If the financial circumstances of India still made it impossible to contemplate any increase in her Army, without an Imperial military subsidy, there are many precedents, both in East and West Africa, for such a step, and the proposal, although it would probably be an unwelcome one to the Imperial Parliament, should not be rejected without very serious consideration. But it is believed that India can no longer plead poverty, and that her present financial position is such as to justify His Majesty's Government calling upon the Indian Government to raise to a standard of safety the establishment of the Indian Army. It is concluded, therefore, that India should now be required to increase the normal British garrison of that country.

37. The Indian Government, of their own initiative, have already under consideration an increase in their artillery establishments, and have submitted to His Majesty's Government certain definite proposals under this head in despatch No. M. 3998 of the 7th May last. These proposals, as regards that arm of the service, appear to be somewhat in excess of local requirements, and it is believed that it will suffice for the present to add the following units to the Indian establishments:—

Unit.	For Field Army.	For Obligatory Garrison.	Total.
Heavy Field Batteries ..	2	..	2
Howitzer Batteries ..	3	..	3
Horse Artillery Batteries ..	2	..	2
Field Batteries	6	6
Garrison Companies ..	2	6	8

The total numerical strength of the establishments of all ranks of these units would be 3,311.

To this should be added an increase of the British battalions in India from 52 to 77.*

These steps would ensure a total augmentation to the Indian Army of 29,111 British troops, all ranks.

38. This increase of the Army in India would raise the effective strength of the Field Army available for operations on the north-west frontier from 91,000 (its present strength as estimated in paragraph 30 above) to about 120,000.

But it has been already pointed out (*vide* paragraphs 31 and 32) that a much larger force than this will be needed to meet all eventualities. It is therefore recommended that the organization of the forces of the Empire should be such as to permit the

* The Interdepartmental Committee on the Defence of India has since recommended an increase of the British battalions in India from 52 to 70.—E. A. January 16, 1903.

despatch to India of two additional Army Corps as soon after the outbreak of war as we attain sea command.

The arrival of these reinforcements would increase the Field Army on the north-west frontier to a strength of about 192,500 men. This might, it is hoped, be further augmented by the despatch of contingents from Australia and Canada, but as at present the rendering of such assistance depends entirely on the views of the Ministers who may at the time be in office in those Colonies, it would be unsafe to count absolutely on such aid in framing our general plan for the defence of the Empire.

39. These conclusions would entail the following establishments for the normal British garrison of India:—

					Establishments, all Ranks.
Cavalry	9 Regiments	5,633
Royal Artillery	}		Horse (Staff and 13 Batteries)	2,123
			Field (Staff and 52 Batteries)	8,457
			Mountain (Staff and 8 Batteries)	899
			Garrison (35 Companies)	4,550
Engineers	1 Company	333
Infantry	77 Battalions	79,464
Army Ordnance Corps	}		Details (say)	700
Royal A.M. Corps					
Total, all ranks, British troops					102,159

The present establishment of all ranks British troops (Army Estimates 1901–1902) is 73,512.

In addition to this, India must maintain her present establishment of local troops, viz.:—

					All Ranks.
Native Army	152,644
Imperial Service Troops	16,000
Volunteers	29,000
Native Army Reserves	20,892
Total, local troops					218,536

It is to be noted that the present establishment of British officers with native regiments of the Indian Army is insufficient to ensure the efficiency of the units in a prolonged campaign; and that it is most necessary that the Indian Government should be urged to make good this serious weakness in its military system.

40. We are now in a position to sum up the conclusions arrived at as to the minimum strength of Imperial troops (other than the Indian Army and colonial troops) which will be needed purely for defensive purposes against a contingency of a war with Russia and France. These conclusions are, however, based on four assumptions, viz.:—

(i.) That the Navy is maintained at a strength adequate to fulfil the responsibility accepted by the Admiralty for the protection of all British possessions both at home and abroad from organized attack by sea.

(ii.) That this responsibility can be taken to include the cases of Malta and Egypt.

(iii.) That Alexandria be fortified.

(iv.) That India and the Colonies maintain, at least, their present military establishments.

Very desirable, but most difficult to arrange. Even in England we have no sufficient reserve of officers.—R.

Given these assumptions, the total defensive forces to be found by the War Office would be :—

						All Ranks.
(i.)	For defence of the United Kingdom	350,000
(ii.)	Colonial Defended Ports (including 15,048 native troops)	46,560
	South Africa (exclusive of normal Cape Town Garrison)	24,466
						71,026
(iii.)	Egypt	8,010
(iv.)	India	102,159
	Total	531,195

41. It will be observed that 15,048 native troops now maintained by the War Office as part of colonial garrisons are included in the above total.

In addition to the above, a reinforcement of two Army Corps must be provided for the defence of India, to be despatched from England when the Navy has acquired sea command.

Australian and Canadian contingents should also be organized for despatch to India as additional reinforcements.

OFFENCE.

42. Only the bare defensive requirements of the Empire have, up to this point, been considered. In the case of India, a margin of troops has been allowed sufficient to admit of advance, but such advance cannot be regarded as a true offensive stroke, as it will be purely local, will be undertaken for defensive purposes, and will lack any objective the capture of which would tend to the termination of the war.

43. Two things are, however, necessary to the successful conduct of every war: first, the protection of our own interests and possessions from the attack of the enemy; secondly, the infliction on the enemy of such injury as will induce him to consent to terminate the war on terms which will afford us a guarantee of future peace and compensation for the personal and material sacrifices the war has entailed on the Empire.

44. A purely defensive policy does not fulfil the second of these two conditions; such a policy would, therefore, probably entail a war of prolonged duration, and is very unlikely to ensure a satisfactory settlement at its termination.

45. But for the British Empire, the prosperity of which is dependent so greatly on the continuance of trade, it is very necessary that a great war with two Continental Powers should be brought to as speedy a termination as possible. A long dragged-out campaign would both enhance the cost of living and lessen the demand for labour; it would therefore press very hardly on the labouring and artisan classes in this country, and tend to produce a discontent which might force the acceptance of peace on very unsatisfactory terms. It is essential, therefore, that the Government should take full advantage of the wave of military enthusiasm and patriotism which at the commencement of the war would pass through the Empire, and by hard and rapid blows at the enemy should bring him to his knees and so wrest advantageous terms of settlement. In saying this I do not suggest that the lower classes of Great Britain would not offer a stubborn resistance, if there were any question of their personally losing national freedom and coming under foreign rule. In such a case, all Englishmen would be true to their race; but a great war may at any time break out through a dispute over some intricate question of African boundaries (*e.g.*, the dispute in West Africa of 1898 and the Fashoda incident) which would be imperfectly understood by the people, and yet might involve vitally the honour or the interests of the Empire. In a war of this nature there would never be lacking men to preach that our enemies were in the right and Great Britain in the wrong; and in a prolonged campaign their teaching that the interests of the working classes of this island are not identical with the interests of the Empire as a whole would in time carry weight, and might lead to lamentable results.

Governments, in shaping their military policy, must necessarily have regard to political conditions, and there can be little doubt that democratic institutions are unfavourable to the continuance of prolonged wars, in which national existence is not directly at stake. The case of the present South African war may be quoted against this conclusion, but it is hardly apposite, as the continuance of the war has interfered but little with trade, and caused hardly any personal distress to the democracy; yet, even in this case, the symptoms hinted at have not been lacking.

46. It is submitted, therefore, that, strategically, economically, and politically, it is essential that our plan of campaign against Russia and France should include offensive action.

47. It is often argued that England needs no other weapons than a defensive force to repel invasion and a powerful Navy to hold the seas. Those who maintain this doctrine presumably imagine that naval victories would terminate a war between Great Britain and one or more of the Continental Powers. No more erroneous assumption can possibly be made. A powerful Navy would, it is true, be a vital weapon of offence against England, to whom the loss of sea supremacy would mean isolation from her Empire, and even starvation for her home population; but, in the hands of England, sea supremacy is but a weapon of defence against Continental nations; and though we are absolutely dependent on the Navy for the continuance of those conditions which are essential to our national existence, yet the Navy is incapable by itself of inflicting a direct blow which will penetrate any vital place in our enemy's armour. We may drive their fleets off the seas, or capture and destroy them; but the food supply of the French and Russian peoples will remain undiminished, their trade will be but little affected, and their national prestige will be but little touched. Napoleon, far from being brought to his knees by Trafalgar, did not reach the zenith of his power until after that supreme naval victory. Operations by land alone availed to overthrow him—the "festering sore" of the Peninsula, the Moscow campaign, and the final stroke of Waterloo.

The true offensive blows of our plan of campaign against France and Russia must therefore be undertaken by the Army, although in every case the co-operation of the Navy is necessary, and no offensive action is possible except on the hypothesis that we have command of the sea.

48. The task of undertaking offensive operations by land against an alliance of France and Russia, whose armies, when mobilized, will reach the gigantic aggregate strength of over 6,000,000 of trained and organized troops, would be absolutely impossible to contemplate, were it not for the great strategical advantage possessed by the Power which holds the command of the sea. Until we have definitely attained such command we must remain on the defensive; but, having once attained it, our enemy's great armies are in a sense paralyzed, and while we can deny to them all opportunity of reinforcing their possessions across the sea, we can choose in such possessions suitable objectives for attack, and, having captured them, can, without anxiety, retain them in our grasp until the termination of the war.

49. In former days, before the advent of railways, the belligerent which held command of the sea, and yet, as regards land forces, was in numerical inferiority, could, by virtue of its maritime supremacy, undertake offensive operations by land in any locality which, though connected by land with the enemy's base, was sufficiently remote to involve for the enemy the drawback of a long line of communications dependent entirely on very indifferent roads. The Peninsular War may be quoted as the most familiar example of this. But the introduction of railways has tended to limit the advantages conferred in this respect by sea command to operations against objectives separated by the sea from the enemy's base, although places such as Port Arthur, which, though connected by land, are not yet connected by rail with their base, may be held to be temporary exceptions to this rule.

50. The considerations set forth in the two preceding paragraphs have a considerable bearing on the problem of determining what objectives should be selected for attack by us in a war against Russia and France.

The primary points to decide in approaching this portion of our problem are: (1) whether we can hope with any advantage to undertake, simultaneously, offensive action against both Russia and France; and (2), if the answer to (1) be in the negative, against which Power, France or Russia, we should concentrate all our potentiality of offence.

51. As regards (1), the question does not need discussion. It is an axiom of all sound strategy to concentrate one's strength where it will be most effective. We are obviously not strong enough to carry through, effectively, offensive operations against both Russia and France simultaneously. It is therefore essential that our plan of

offence should be directed against that one of the two Powers which is most vulnerable to an attack.

52. Russia is open to attack by us in four directions :—

- (a.) An advance in Central Asia from India.
- (b.) An attack on the Russian naval bases of Vladivostock and Port Arthur in the Far East.
- (c.) An attack on Russia in the Caucasus.
- (d.) The destruction of the Russian commerce in the Black Sea.

53. As regards (a), it has been already pointed out that, though a forward policy is, for political reasons, the only one consistent with any sound plan for the defence of India, yet the results of such an advance will not be such as to lead by themselves to a favourable peace; and the advance contemplated will therefore be rather an incident of defence than a factor in an offensive plan. Moreover, the further we push back the Russians in Central Asia, the greater will be our own military difficulties in insuring for our Army the regular supplies of food, ammunition, and reinforcements it will need.

54. As regards (b), the conclusions arrived at in Captain Peach's Memorandum (*vide* Appendix I, p. 53) appear sound, *i.e.*, that "Vladivostock is now almost impregnable, and the combined rail and river steam route through China enables Russia to send help to the already powerful forces she now maintains in the East (*i.e.*, well over 100,000 men east of Lake Baikal)—forces which were never contemplated by the advocates of 'Russia bleeding to death through Vladivostock.' Port Arthur and the Manchurian Railway, though also open to the similar objection, might be an objective worth considering later in the campaign with Japan as an ally. No blow struck in the Far East could relieve pressure on India or so fatally injure the Russian Empire as to force an early and advantageous conclusion to the war."*

55. (c) has in former years been strongly supported by high authorities as the only sound policy to adopt in a war between this country and Russia. (*Vide* paragraphs 15 *et seq.* of Sir H. Brackenbury's Memorandum of the 12th June, 1890, approved by Lord Wolseley and quoted on p. 62 of Appendix II).

But this policy was urged on the grounds that it would prevent Russia from advancing against India. It was admitted, moreover, that it was impossible to attack Russia in the Caucasus without the help of Turkey, and it was concluded that, without such alliance, it was impossible for us to fight Russia single-handed. (*Vide* paragraph 20 of Sir H. Brackenbury's Memorandum.)

56. Having regard to existing political relations, it is clear that, not only can we not rely on the active support of Turkey, but that such support would be improbable in the event of Russia and France declaring war against Great Britain. Turkey would, in fact, be ill-advised if she listened to our persuasion and joined in such a war. If successful, public opinion in England would probably refuse to recompense her by the restoration of her lost territory; if unsuccessful, she would be swept out of Europe. She would, therefore, have everything to lose and nothing to gain.

57. But, apart from this, Captain Peach points out (p. 57 of Appendix I) that Russia's communications with India are no longer open to our attack by this plan of operation. Instead of formerly lying south of Caucasus, they now run to the north of that range, and are practically unassailable.

58. A final and insuperable objection to the project is the great military strength which Russia would have available to repel our attack. Captain Peach shows that she would be able, without difficulty, to concentrate half a million men to meet an advance through the Caucasus.

An offensive campaign, therefore, in this region could be only contemplated by Great Britain if with powerful allies she were fighting Russia without any allies—a case entirely different from that under consideration in this paper.

59. An attack on the Russian trade in the Black Sea would hit a vulnerable point. But this operation would be mainly a naval one, to be undertaken after we attained sea command, and when ships could be spared from other more pressing duties (*e.g.*, co-operation in the destruction of hostile coaling-stations). The squadron assigned to this task should, in fact, dominate until the end of the war the whole of the Black Sea; it should stop all trade, and by feints at various ports might draw off forces, which could otherwise be sent by Russia to the support of her troops operating against India. With a view to these raids on ports, the Fleet might be accompanied by a landing force of

* This conclusion is, I think, somewhat modified by our alliance with Japan.—W. G. N. January 16, 1903.

some 5,000 to 10,000 troops, but, so long as Turkey remained neutral, due regard should be had to the great strength of the Russian land forces in this region, and great care would be necessary not to commit our troops at any distance from the support of the ships. If, however, Turkey should declare war against Russia in order to recover her lost territory, we might co-operate with the Turkish forces, in whatever way the circumstances of the campaign might show to be expedient. But the active co-operation of Turkey is not a reliable factor; indeed, Lord Salisbury, so far back as 1887, expressed the opinion that "it is as certain as any diplomatic forecast can be that England will never have the command of the Turkish Army (*vide* p. 5 of Major-General Newmarch's Memorandum, dated November 1891, printed for use of the Cabinet). Such an hypothesis must, therefore, be eliminated from the present scheme.

60. It is concluded, therefore, that the only effective offensive stroke of any magnitude which could be undertaken against Russia is the attack of Port Arlur and the Manchurian Railway, but that this project would probably need the help of Japan, and, in any case, even if successful, would not suffice to bring a war to an early termination.

61. The strategical advantage for offence conferred by sea supremacy can be utilized far more fully against France than against Russia, for the former has replaced those Colonies which were wrested from her in the old wars by extensive over-sea possessions in North, West, and East Africa, Australasia, and China. Although these possessions are by no means a source of wealth to France, yet there can be no doubt that the loss of them would inflict a great blow to her national pride, and that, if seized by us, they would form valuable hostages by the use of which a satisfactory peace might be secured.

62. These Colonies are dependent on constant communication with their mother country in a more marked degree than most of our own colonial dominions. In all of them, except, perhaps, Martinique, large discontented native populations are controlled by garrisons of French troops, or of native troops with French officers. The administrative staff is purely French. The Colony is in each case dependent on France for the renewal of these troops and staff, and for their supply of food and material in war. To ensure communication with France, there has been established in each of these possessions a defended port, to act as a coaling station for the French navy, and as a port of refuge for the French mercantile marine. These defended ports are, therefore, the very heart and lungs of the French Colonies, and their capture would enable us in each case to paralyze, if not to dominate, the whole Colony. Moreover, these ports are bases from which French cruisers will issue to prey on our commerce, or to interrupt the transport of British troops by sea. Their destruction is, therefore, essential to our complete command of the sea, and has been so recognized by the Joint Naval and Military Committee, who, in 1893, when considering "the general principles of policy" which should be pursued by this country in a war with France, specifically recommended "the immediate seizure of the enemy's foreign bases."

63. Moreover, in weighing the relative advantages of directing our offensive effort against France rather than Russia, it is worth noting that, not only does the former present far more vulnerable points of attack than the latter, but also that political considerations render it probable that the resolution of the former to continue the war would be more easily affected than the latter. A series of disasters in the French Colonies would, it is thought, induce the excitable French democracy to upset their Government, and having thrown on it all responsibility of ill-success, to declare for peace. The "colonial party" in France, though increasingly powerful, does not yet represent national opinion, and it is doubtful if the French lower classes would desire to continue a war in which no glory was to be won, unless, as in 1870, the sacredness of France's own soil was threatened. In Russia, on the other hand, the supreme power rests in the hands of a Government which would be unaffected by waves of popular emotion; the decision would be based on a far-reaching policy, and there would be no shrinking from punishment if, by steady endurance, ultimate success could be insured.

64. Again, Russia's only weak point is her poverty. With France as her ally, and French credit to support her own, Russia's financial anxieties would be greatly eased; if France could be detached, the financial position of Russia would make it extremely difficult for her to continue the war alone.

65. For these reasons it is submitted that our main strokes of offence should be directed against France, and that they should aim at the seizure and retention of the naval bases of Biserta in the Mediterranean, Dakar in West Africa, Martinique in the West Indies, Diego Suarez in Madagascar, Saigon in China, and Noumea in Australia; the ports of Kotonou in Dahomey, and Jibutil in the Red Sea, should also be occupied.

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These places should be captured as soon as the fleet is in a position to co-operate. They should be seized, if it be possible, simultaneously, or at least in rapid succession. This seizure would complete our command of the sea, and the various expeditionary forces should be of sufficient strength to ensure the retention of each port until the end of the war, and with it the domination of the Colony concerned.

66. Biserta, the most important of all these defended ports, is the French naval base on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean. So long as it remains in French hands, its strategical situation constitutes it a standing menace to our line of communications with India, and even to Malta itself. Biserta is the key to the French possessions in North Africa. With Biserta in our hands, the occupation of Tunis would be an easy matter, and in possession of these two places, we would directly menace the overthrow of French authority throughout both Tunisia and Algeria.

The normal garrison of Tunisia is 16,000 men, of whom 4,000 are stationed at Biserta.

In the scheme which has been drawn up for the capture of Biserta, it is estimated that the following force would suffice to take the place:—

Divisional Staff.		
Cavalry and Mounted Infantry	..	{ 1 Brigade of Cavalry. 1 Battalion Mounted Infantry.
Engineers	{ 2 Field Companies R.E. 1 Balloon Detachment.
Artillery	{ 2 Companies Siege Train, 8" Howitzers. 1 Company Siege Train, 6" Howitzers. 2 Companies Siege Train, 6" Guns. 2 Batteries 5" Howitzers. 1 Battery 4.7" Guns. 4 Batteries Field Artillery. 2 Ammunition Columns.
Infantry	{ 3 Brigades of Infantry.
Departmental (Additional to Brigade details)	..	{ 2 Army Service Companies. 2 Field Hospitals. 1 Bearer Company. 1 Base Hospital.

Or a total force of about 20,600 men.

But Tunisia is connected by rail with Algeria, which has a French garrison of 64,000 men. The whole of this garrison could not be concentrated in Tunisia without a general rising in Algeria and the overthrow therein of French authority. A considerable force might, however, be detached to attack us in Tunisia, and it is considered, therefore, that, for the retention of Biserta and the subsequent occupation of Tunis, a head-quarter staff, a division of cavalry, a brigade of mounted infantry, and an Army Corps should be added to our expeditionary force for covering purposes and subsequent operations. The total British force required would, therefore, amount to about 64,000 men.

67. Dakar is the French naval base in West Africa, and is in close proximity to St. Louis, with which it is connected by rail. St. Louis is the head-quarters of the Governor-General of Senegal.* The existence of this naval base on the flank of our own communications with the Cape of Good Hope would be a matter of much inconvenience. The capture of it and of St. Louis would undermine the whole French position in West Africa, and imperil the continuance of those great Colonies in the acquisition of which France has made so many sacrifices. The normal garrison of Senegal is about 5,000; but the total French forces in West Africa reach (as already stated in paragraph 24 above) an aggregate of 2,922 Europeans and 10,888 natives. The seizure and retention of Dakar will serve as an effective counterstroke against any enterprise which those forces may undertake against Sierra Leone or other of our West African possessions.

Dakar is strongly fortified, and in the scheme which has been prepared in the Intelligence Division for its capture, it is estimated that the expeditionary force should consist of about 12,000 men.

* Since the above was written Dakar has been made the seat of Government, in place of St. Louis.—
E. A. January 16, 1903.

The units proposed for this force are :—

A Divisional Staff.				
Cavalry and Mounted Infantry	{ 1 Squadron of Cavalry. 2 Companies Mounted Infantry.
Artillery	{ 1 Siege Company, 8" Howitzers. 1 Battery 6" guns. 3 Batteries 5" Howitzers. 1 Battery Field Artillery. 2 Ammunition Columns.
Engineers	{ 1 Field Company. 1 Telegraph Section. $\frac{1}{2}$ Railway Company. 1 Balloon Detachment.
Infantry	2 Brigades.
Departmental (additional to Brigade details)	{ 2 A.S.C. Companies. 2 Field Hospitals. 1 Bearer Company. 1 Base Hospital.

As soon as Dakar is taken, St. Louis should be seized, and both garrisoned by our troops until the end of the war.

68. Martinique is the only defended French coaling station in the Western Atlantic. Its capture would free our possessions in the West Indies from any possibility of hostile raids.

The normal French garrison is about 2,000 men, but the country is very difficult, and favourable to defence.

It is considered that the following expeditionary force would be necessary for its capture :—

A Divisional Staff.				
Mounted Infantry	3 Companies.
Artillery	{ 1 Siege Company, 8" Howitzers. 1 Battery 6" guns. 2 Batteries 5" Howitzers. 2 Mountain Batteries. 2 Ammunition columns.
Engineers	{ 1 Field Company. 1 Balloon Detachment. 1 Telegraph Company.
Infantry	2 Brigades (of 3 Battalions each).
Departmental (additional to Brigade details)	{ 1 A.S. Company. 1 Field Hospital. 1 Bearer Company. 1 Base Hospital.

The total strength of the above force would be about 10,000 men.

After the island had been captured and its garrison removed, two battalions and two batteries would probably suffice to hold it till the end of the war.

69. Diego Suarez both protects the sea communications between the French Colony of Madagascar and France, and acts as a menace to our communications with India via the Cape, as well as to our secondary naval base in Mauritius. The capture of this defended port would, in all probability, be the signal for a general rising in Madagascar, and would probably result in the overthrow of the French power in that island. English rule would, it is believed, be welcomed by the inhabitants, and the permanent retention of the island after the war would be a matter for consideration. In any case, Diego Suarez should be occupied till the end of the war.

The total garrison of Madagascar and Réunion is about 9,300 Europeans and

13,900 natives, but the latter include 5,000 Malagasy levies, whose loyalty to France is doubtful and military value slight.

The actual garrison of Diego Suarez is 4,300 Europeans and 1,000 natives, the latter being Senegalese. Owing to the difficulty of communications with the northern ports of the island and to the distribution of the greater portion of the garrison of Madagascar in scattered detachments, it is not probable that any considerable reinforcements could be sent to Diego Suarez on an emergency.

The country round Diego Suarez is exceedingly well adapted to defence.

The defences of the place (as to which we have good information) have been considerably strengthened lately, and it is therefore considered that the expeditionary force for its capture should be composed as follows :—

A Divisional Staff.				
Mounted Infantry	4 Companies.
Artillery	{ 1 Siege Company, 8" Howitzers. 1 " " 6" " " 3 Batteries 5" Howitzer. " 3 " " Field Artillery. 2 Mountain Batteries. 2 Ammunition Columns.
Engineers	{ 2 Field Companies. 1 Balloon Detachment. 1 Telegraph Company.
Infantry	{ 3 Brigades. 2 Battalions for lines of communication.
Departmental (additional to Brigade details)	{ 2 A.S. Companies. 2 Field Hospitals. 1 Bearer Company. 1 Base Hospital.

Or a total force of about 19,000 men.

70. Saigon is the administrative capital of Cochin-China, and lies about 40 miles up the Saigon River, the mouth of which is defended by the fortifications of Cap St. Jacques. It is a naval base and the most important harbour in French Indo-China. The normal garrison of Cap St. Jacques, Saigon, and its vicinity is about 3,000.

The total garrison of the province of Cochin-China is about 6,000.

The total garrison of the whole of French Indo-China has hitherto been about 27,000. It is rumoured that this will be further increased by 2,000 of the troops returning from the recent operations in China.

About two-thirds of these garrisons are native troops.

The difficulties of communications and of possible complications with the Chinese, and, above all, the probability of native risings, would prevent any large reinforcement in war of the local garrison of Saigon and its defended port. Under the most favourable circumstances, and if the French had command of the sea, it would take nearly three days to reinforce Saigon from Tonkin. No reinforcement could be sent from Annam, as there are only 800 men in the whole province.

It is proposed, therefore, to assign the capture of this important naval base to the following expeditionary force :—

A Divisional Staff.				
Mounted Infantry	2 Companies.
Artillery	{ 2 Siege Companies, 8" Howitzers. 1 Battery 6" guns. 3 Batteries 5" Howitzers. 2 Mountain Batteries. 1 Ammunition Column.
Engineers	{ 1 Field Company. 1 Balloon Detachment. 1 Telegraph Company.
Infantry	2 Brigades.
Departmental (additional to Brigade details)	{ 2 A.S. Companies. 2 Field Hospitals. 1 Bearer Company. 1 Base Hospital.

Or a total force of about 12,000 men.

In the schemes which have hitherto been prepared for the capture of Saigon the employment of Indian troops has been contemplated; but in the contingency of war with Russia and France it would be impracticable to draw on the Indian Army for this purpose.

71. Noumea is the naval base of the French navy in New Caledonia. Its acquisition is desirable, first, with a view to freeing Australian waters from the predatory action of French cruisers, which would otherwise use that port as a base; and secondly, with a view to the gratification of the legitimate ambition of Australasia to oust from that region all foreign rule. The actual French garrison of Noumea is 1,500. The capture of the place could be easily effected by Australian troops, and a scheme to carry out this project will be arranged with the Australian military authorities.

72. Jibutil, or Djibouti, as the French call it, is the Red Sea port of French Somaliland. It at present lacks defences, although its fortification is under consideration. The local garrison is only 150 men. The occupation of this place is expedient for political reasons; its possession would give us the Jibuti-Harrar Railway, which will, if it remains in French hands, entirely destroy the trade of the British port of Zeyla. The port of Jibutil, moreover, is an excellent one, and in many respects superior to Aden.

The force sent to seize Jibutil would probably meet with little opposition, but must be of sufficient strength to resist any difficulties which might subsequently arise with natives.

It is suggested, therefore, that it should consist of—

A brigade staff.
 100 camelry.
 2 guns.
 600 infantry.
 Medical details.

The force could probably be organized from East African troops, assisted by the Aden garrison, but this must depend on the circumstances of the moment.

73. Kotonou is the seaport and capital of French Dahomey in West Africa. Its acquisition is necessary as a political measure, and would be a blow to French prestige in West Africa. A scheme for the occupation of this place by the West African Frontier Force was, with the approval of the Colonial Office, prepared in 1897, and this scheme is still practicable. The actual garrison of Kotonou is only 300 men. The expedition would advance overland from Lagos.

74. The occupation of St. Pierre, the island off Nova Scotia, where the French cables to America land, has been arranged with the Admiralty, and will be effected from Halifax on the outbreak of war with France. St. Pierre is without defences and has no garrison except about fifty gendarmerie.

75. It will be apparent, therefore, from the nine previous paragraphs, that, while the minor places Jibutil, Kotonou, Noumea, and St. Pierre can be taken and occupied by local forces, the five great French colonial naval bases of Biserta, Dakar, Martinique,

Diego Suarez, and Saigon will require the dispatch of the following expeditionary forces from England for their capture and retention till the end of the war :—

							All Ranks.
Biserta*	64,000
Dakar	12,000
Martinique	10,000
Diego Suarez	19,000
Saigon	10,000
	Total	115,000

76. The units which it is estimated would be required to make up the whole of the force are shown in the following Table, but the estimate must be taken only as approximate, as the schemes have not been yet approved, and will require further examination in detail; generally, however, the figures given may be taken as adequate, having regard to the tasks required from each force.

* The capture of Biserta would undoubtedly be advantageous; but the place is so strong naturally, and has been so strongly fortified, that the operation would present great difficulties, apart from the transport by sea of the force contemplated.—W. G. N. *January 16, 1903.*

Place.	Cavalry.		Artillery.										Engineers.			Infantry.	A.S.C.	R.A.M.C.		
	Regiments.	Battalions M.I.	Siege Companies 8" Howitzers.	Siege Companies 6" Howitzers.	Battery 6" Guns.	Battery 5" Howitzers.	Battery 4.7".	Battery H.A.	Batteries F.A.	Batteries, Mountain.	Ammunition Columns.	Field Companies.	Telegraph Division.	Balloon Detachment.	Railway Company.	Battalions.	Companies.	Field Hospital.	Base Hospital.	Bearer Companies.
Biserta (attacking force)	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	..	4	..	2	2	..	1	..	12	6	6	1	5
Biserta (covering force)	8	4½	4	15	..	7	4	1	1	1	25	13	13	..	9
Dakar ..	4	4	1	..	1	3	1	..	2	1	1	1	½	8	4	4	3	1
Martinique	4	1	..	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	..	6	4	4	1	3
Diego Suarez	4	1	1	..	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	..	14	4	4	1	3
Saigon	4	1	..	1	3	2	1	1	1	1	..	8	4	4	1	1
Total ..	10½	6½	6	2	5	13	1	4	23	6	16	11	5	6	1½	73	55	35	7	22

77. The total numerical strength, therefore, which will be required for the military needs of the Empire in the contingency contemplated in these papers would be—

	All Ranks.
Home Defence	350,000
Colonial Defended Ports and South Africa	71,036
Egypt	8,010
India (normal British garrison)	102,159
At home in peace, but for Indian reinforcements	72,518
foreign service in war { Offensive expeditions	115,000
Total	718,723
Deduct native troops included in garrison of defended ports ..	15,048
Total British troops	703,675

Deducting from this total the proposed normal garrison of India, the number of British troops actually to be paid out of War Office Votes would be 601,516. This number, however, is exclusive of the Reserves, which would be needed for the army in the field.

The numbers provided for in the present Estimates are as follows :—

Number of Officers and men on establishment of Regular Army, exclusive of India, Colonial troops, and of "additional numbers" allowed during war..	196,476
Army Reserve	90,000
Militia	131,539
Militia Reserve	50,000
Yeomanry	35,000
Volunteers	375,000
Total	878,015

Deducting the Army Reserve, therefore, the present Army Estimates provide for the maintenance of 788,015 British troops, exclusive of "additional numbers allowed for during the war."

The actual requirements of the present scheme only amount to 601,516 British troops (exclusive of Reserves) to be maintained out of War Office funds. It is evident that the difference allows of an ample margin for the creation of a real reserve to the offensive forces after their departure from England.

It may therefore be concluded that the scheme will not entail any addition in peace time to the aggregate of the total establishments, which the Army Estimates of the current year regard as normal.

78. As regards the home defensive force, it has already been suggested that it should be organized into—

- (a.) Garrisons of defended ports.
- (b.) Mobile army.

It has also been pointed out that, until we have attained sea command—that is, until practically all serious danger of invasion has passed away—there would be in the United Kingdom under this scheme the reinforcements for India and the offensive expeditionary forces, which, together, would be the equivalent of a Cavalry Division, a Mounted Infantry Brigade, and five Army Corps.

It is considered, therefore, that the actual home defence force, of which no part will be liable to foreign service, should be created entirely from existing units of Volunteers and Yeomanry, excepting only a certain number of garrison artillery companies and engineer units, which it is desirable should continue to be furnished from the Regular Army and the Militia. The exact composition of this force cannot be fixed until the receipt of the Report of the Committee which is now examining the question of the garrisons needed by the various defended ports. When this has been determined, the establishments of

each portion of the Yeomanry and Volunteers, which, in the future, will be allowed to serve without liability to foreign service in time of war, should not exceed the requirements of the home defensive force.

79. Assuming for the purpose of rough estimate that the number of garrison companies of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer units at present allotted to the garrisons of defended ports will remain unchanged, the following Table represents the units of British troops of the Regular Army or of British troops liable to foreign service in war needed to fulfil the requirements of the scheme :—

	Home Defence (Garrison Artillery and Engineers only)		Colonies: Defended Ports and South Africa, exclusive of Native Troops		Egypt (British Troops only)		India, Normal Garrison (British Troops only)		India, War Reinforcements (two Army Corps)		Special Expeditionary Forces		Total		
	
Artillery.	Cavalry Regiments.	28½	
	Mounted Infantry Battalions.	6½	
	Siege Companies 8" Howitzers.	6	
	Siege Companies 6" Howitzers.	2	
	Batteries 6" Guns.	5	
	Batteries 5" Howitzers.	13	
	Batteries 4·7" Guns.	1	
	H.A. Batteries.	21	
	Field Batteries.	129	
	Mountain Batteries.	14	
	Garrison Companies.	48	..	37	..	2	..	35	117	
	Ammunition Columns.	22	
	Engineers.	Field Companies.	2	18	4	2	1	23
Fortress Companies.		6	19	
S.M. Companies.		8	12	
Pontoon Troops.		2	4	
Telegraph Division.		1	8	
Field Park.		3	
Railway Companies.		3½	
Balloon Sections.		8	
Infantry Battalions.		38	6	214	
A.S.C. Companies.		47	
Medical.		Field Hospitals.	45
		Base Hospitals.	8
		Bearer Companies.	28

79. The following is a comparison between these requirements as regards the principal arms of the service and the existing units in the Regular Army :—

	Number needed under Scheme.	Number of Units now existing in Regular Army.	Remarks.
Cavalry Regiments	28½	31	2½ surplus.
Mounted Infantry Battalions	6½	Nil.	6½ deficient.
Artillery—			
Siege Companies and Heavy Batteries.. .. .	14	4	10 "
5" Howitzer Batteries	13	15	2 surplus.
H.A. Batteries	21	28	7 "
Field Artillery	129	120	9 deficient.
Mountain Batteries.. .. .	14	11	3 "
Garrison Companies	117	100	17 "
Engineer Units	69	77	8 surplus.
Infantry Battalions	244	167*	77 deficient.

80. It is proposed that the deficiencies and discrepancies shown in the above Table should be made good as follows :—

Cavalry.—There is a small surplus of cavalry regiments.

Mounted Infantry.—Mounted infantry units are non-existent in peace time under our present system, except as temporary companies under process of training. It is suggested that the units included should be drawn in future from the Yeomanry, and that 10,000 of that force should be made liable to foreign service in war. This would give a surplus of some 7,000 Yeomen for a final reserve to the offensive army.

Artillery.—The total number of artillery units needed under the scheme is 308; the number of regular artillery units at present existing is only 278, leaving a deficit of 30. It is suggested that these should be provided by the creation of a corresponding number of artillery units liable to foreign service out of the Militia. It will be observed, too, that, over and above the actual deficiency in units, our present organization does not conform with requirements as to the number of units needed of certain classes of artillery. For instance, although it was laid down by the Joint Naval and Military Committee eight years ago that our policy in a war with France should include the immediate destruction of the French naval bases, no attempt has been made in the organization of the artillery to provide the large number of siege companies and heavy batteries which would be essential to that task. On the other hand, a surplus of 7 Horse Artillery batteries over actual requirements has been provided. The deficiencies can, therefore, to a certain extent, be met by readjustment.

It would also be necessary that there should be in the country a certain number of artillery units, from which a general reserve force (available for foreign service) could be formed after the dispatch of the offensive force and the reinforcements for India. It is suggested that these reserve units should be eighteen in number, and should be formed from specially-selected Volunteer Corps, *e.g.*, the Honourable Artillery Company. The liability to serve abroad must be made definitely binding by attestation for such service. In all, therefore, this proposal will entail the creation out of the Militia of 30, and from the Volunteers, of 15 artillery units liable to foreign service in war.

Infantry.—The number of battalions needed under the scheme will be 244.

The present Estimates provided—

10 Guards Battalions.
156 Territorial Battalions.
8 Battalions Garrison Regiments.

Total .. 174

But of these, 5 garrison battalions have not been raised, and two line battalions (3rd and 4th Liverpool) have been since ordered to be reduced.

* Not counting five Garrison Battalions not raised and two battalions, Liverpool Regiment, to be disbanded, which appear in the Estimates.

There are left, therefore, only—

	10	Guards Battalions.
	154	Territorial Battalions.
	3	Garrison Battalions.
Total ..	167	

Thus there is a deficiency of 77 of the battalions needed by the scheme for foreign service.

It has been suggested on another paper that two Cypriot battalions should be raised for service at Malta or in Egypt.

If this be ultimately approved,* a deficiency of only 75 battalions would remain.

It is proposed to meet this deficiency and the further need of reserve battalions for the formation of a final reserve by converting the whole of the Militia into a force liable to serve abroad in time of war.

There are at present in existence 124 battalions of Militia of the United Kingdom (exclusive of the Channel Islands Militia). These, with the two Cypriot battalions, would give a total number of 293 battalions liable to foreign service in war, or—

244 required by the scheme.
51 reserve battalions.

Engineers.—The existing units of Royal Engineers appear sufficient under the scheme.

81. The above proposals are submitted subject to further examination in detail, but it is believed that they are feasible, and would insure the number of units required under this scheme for offence and defence, and in addition, the following final reserve available for foreign service :—

Imperial Yeomanry	about 7,000 men.
Artillery	18 batteries.
Infantry	51 reserve battalions.

This reserve might be organized into brigades or divisions for despatch as further reinforcements if needed, but they must be in no way regarded as any part of the home defensive forces.

82. The following objections may, perhaps, be advanced against this scheme :—

(a.) *Constitutional.*—It may be urged that the Militia is a force whose *raison d'être* is purely for defence.

(b.) *Administrative.*—(i.) The large proportion of regular battalions, which will be on foreign service, is a violation of the principle of the Cardwell system that each battalion on foreign service is to be fed by a corresponding battalion at home.

(ii.) Recruiting for the Army will be injuriously affected by the larger proportion of foreign service which a regular soldier will be required to face.

(iii.) Recruiting for Militia will be affected by liability for foreign service in war.

(iv.) The actual strength of Militia battalions is much below war establishments, and yet under this scheme they are counted as equivalent to a battalion at war strength.

(v.) Neither officers nor men of the Militia are sufficiently trained for the duties which it is proposed to assign to them.

(vi.) A home defence force composed mainly of Volunteers would not be sufficiently efficient.

(c.) *Financial.*—That the nation is not prepared to accept any large increase in the Army Estimates.

83. As regards the constitutional objection, it is, in reality, more or less a sentimental one, but even if it be pressed, there is an absolute reply to it in the fact that our present Militia is an entirely modern force, dating back only to 1852, and is quite distinct from the dormant organization of the ancient national Militia. The essential principle of the latter force, which was the direct descendant of the old Anglo-Saxon "fyrd," is that every free Englishman is under an obligation to bear arms in the defence of his country when summoned by proper authority. This principle is rooted in the history of the English race, and is a prominent feature even in the records of those fore-

* This proposal has been negatived.—W. G. N. *January 16, 1903.*

fathers from whom the English race sprang, and to whose usages the germs of English freedom can be clearly traced. It may be freely admitted that this historical obligation of compulsory military service was limited to duty for the defence of England, and that there is no constitutional precedent for any man being required against his will to serve beyond the seas, save only in the Navy. The modern Militia is, however, raised not under this principle, but under a voluntary contract between the State and the individual—a contract which can be amended if both contracting parties so agree. There is, therefore, no Constitutional obstacle whatever to this contract being in the future so changed as to give to the State the assurance that in war time the modern Militia will be available for service abroad. Moreover, there is ample precedent for the employment of Militia abroad in war time in the Peninsula, the Crimea, and the present campaign.

84. The question of the balance between the home and foreign battalions of the Regular Army is a more serious one. Such a balance was undoubtedly a prominent feature in Mr. Cardwell's organization scheme, subject, however, to the important proviso—a proviso which has never yet been given effect to—that whenever both battalions of a territorial regiment are abroad, a third battalion should at once be created at home.

The scheme put forward in this paper does not contemplate increasing the number of British battalions in the Regular Army. It does contemplate, however, 121 battalions being permanently employed on foreign service. The raising of two Cypriot battalions would reduce this number to 119, of which three would be "garrison" battalions, leaving 116 to be provided from the Guards and the line. Deducting garrison battalions, there are at present 166 British battalions, of whom ten are Guards. So long, at least, as the force suggested in paragraph 25 above remains in South Africa, it is submitted that five out of ten Guards battalions may reasonably be deemed available for foreign service. This would leave 111 battalions to be furnished from the line, the distribution of whose battalions would be as follows:—

Total	156	}	111 abroad.
														45 at home.
Difference		66

Sixty-six of the line battalions abroad would lack corresponding line battalions at home.

Some special measures will clearly be needed to meet this difficulty. Two remedies appear to offer themselves:—

(a.) The creation of large *depôts*, similar to the Guards' *depôt* at Caterham. There is no doubt as to the success of the Caterham *depôt*; officers of the Guards attribute to it much of the smartness of their men, but it would seem more than doubtful whether a composite *depôt* made up of men enlisted for various regiments and lacking, therefore, *esprit de corps* would work equally well.

(b.) The putting in force of Mr. Cardwell's proviso by the permanent embodiment of a portion of the cadre of a Militia battalion of every two-battalion territorial regiment, both of whose battalions are abroad, and of every four-battalion territorial regiment, of which three battalions are abroad. If four battalions of a regiment were abroad, the cadres of two Militia battalions of that regiment would be embodied.

It is suggested that the cadre embodied should comprise a Field Officer of the line battalions (who should be appointed second in command of the Militia battalion), the battalion staff, and the officers, sergeants, and 10 per cent. of the rank and file of four companies; the staff of additional companies might be called up if specially required. The Militia sergeants would probably need strengthening and perhaps replacing by a certain number of line sergeants. Similarly, one line officer should be allowed per company. Line and Militia recruits, when first enlisted, should be put through the present course of preliminary instruction at the *depôt*; the line recruits would subsequently be sent to the embodied battalion, and then further instructed until fit for foreign service. Militia battalions being, as a rule, under war establishment, the whole battalion, when called out for training, would not be too big for one command, and the officers would have the advantage of commanding strong companies. The Militiamen called up for training would complete the embodied companies to full establishment, and the remainder would be posted to the other half-battalion.

A difficulty may perhaps arise in securing a sufficient number of Militia officers who would be willing to do duty all the year round, or in turns for six months at a time. If this should prove to be the case, it is suggested that the Italian *congé* system should be tried for a certain number of officers of the line. There are a considerable number of officers in the English Army who, with a love for sport or travelling, and with means to enjoy both, combine a keen desire to be soldiers in war time. Many of these men are good leaders in the field, and yet find in peace the continued routine of instructing young soldiers to be irksome; and, as the regulation periods of leave are insufficient for them, they leave the army when there appears to be no immediate prospect of active service. Officers of this stamp hardly reach the highest stamp of an ideal soldier, yet many of them are admirable fighters, and very useful officers. The actual remuneration they receive in the Service is of little importance to them, and it is reasonable to suppose that, if by foregoing a portion of the somewhat small pecuniary advantage the State offers for military service at home they could obtain a large increase in their periods of leave, they would be loth to sever their connection with the Regular Army, and with it lose the hope of further active service.

It is suggested, therefore, that a certain number of officers of this type should be employed with the embodied Militia battalions, on the condition that they did annually six months' duty and received only six months' pay, the remaining six months being spent on leave without pay, the period of actual duty only to count towards pension. The advantage of this system would be that for the pay of only one officer, the battalion would in peace obtain the continuous services of an experienced army officer, and in war would have two such officers.

As only 66 line battalions would be serving abroad in peace time without linked battalions at home, the system proposed in this paragraph would involve the permanent embodiment of only 33 half-battalions of Militia.

As contrasted with (a), it is submitted that not only would it probably supply more efficient drafts to the foreign battalions, but it would tend to the efficiency of the Militia unit concerned.

85. *Effect on Recruiting for the Line.*—The objection that the larger proportion of infantry on foreign service will injuriously affect recruiting is believed not to be well founded. On the contrary, the majority of men are anxious to get abroad, to see the world, and obtain a complete change of surroundings. An increased period of foreign service may possibly be unpopular with a certain proportion of the officers of the Army; on the other hand, the larger number of battalions in India will tend to assist the professional officer of small means. In no case would the change prevent a sufficient supply of officers for the Regular Army.

86. *Effect on Recruiting for the Militia.*—The large proportion of the Militia which have volunteered for active service during the present war tends to the conviction that hardly a recruit would be lost by the attachment to enlistment in the Militia of a liability to active service abroad in war time. The terms of enlistment should, of course, be so worded as to render it clear that the Militia battalions would not be required to serve out of the United Kingdom in any but a war of some magnitude, *i.e.*, when the Army Reserves are called out. The change proposed would, in fact, much improve the status of the Militia.

87. *The Present Numerical Deficiencies in the Militia.*—These deficiencies would be met—

(a.) From the Army Reserve, and

(b.) From the Military Reserve, which, with the Militia, should be made liable to foreign service in war time. The 33 embodied units would be up to their full establishment on mobilization, owing to the large number of linesmen in their ranks, although a proportion of these men would not be fit immediately for active service, and would need replacing.

88. *Efficiency of the Militia.*—This will need special attention. The weak points of the Militia are—

(a.) Uninstructed officers and non-commissioned officers, and

(b.) The unpractical nature of the instruction given in the annual training.

(a) should be met by the expenditure of money in attaching officers and non-commissioned officers more freely to line units, not for barrack square drill, which should be learnt at the *dépôt*, but for practical instruction in their duties in the field. The system

of embodying a certain proportion of the Militia would also tend to leaven up gradually the whole force.

(b) is a matter which should be corrected by a system of inspection in field duties instead of at ceremonial exercises, and also by the provision of proper training-grounds for all Militia units. So long as a Militia battalion is only given a 10-acre field to train in, it is impossible for either officers or men to attain efficiency.

Moreover, a little forethought and arrangement will obviate the necessity for the employment of Militia battalions in the first line of offensive operations.

The scheme requires the dispatch from England of—

	50 Battalions to India.
	73 for offensive expeditions.
Total ..	123

There will be at home 5 Guards battalions and 43 line battalions; only 75 Militia battalions will therefore be needed.

Fifty of the 75 should be dispatched to India; 25 of these could release for active service at the front 25 line battalions from duty at Aden, at Ceylon, and with the obligatory garrisons of India. The remaining 25 Militia battalions could be kept in second line on the line of communications.

The offensive expeditionary forces would, therefore, originally include 48 Guards and line battalions, and only 25 Militia battalions.

Of these 25, 10 could relieve the infantry garrisons of Malta and Gibraltar (10 battalions), which would thus be set free for the Biserta expedition.

Six could relieve 6 line battalions in South Africa, which would thus be available for the Diego Suarez expedition.

Two could relieve the line battalions at Hong Kong and Singapore, which would thus be available for the Saigon expedition.

This would leave, therefore, only 7 Militia battalions, which should be included in the Army Corps added to the Biserta expedition, and might, if necessary, be held in reserve.

The scheme, therefore, does not involve the employment of the Militia on any more responsible duties than those which they have already performed in South Africa.

89. *Efficiency of the Home Defence Force.*—It has been already pointed out in the earlier portion of this paper that the defence of the United Kingdom will not be left to this force until the danger of serious invasion has passed away, the enemy's fleets having been driven off the seas. Yet it is necessary that the force should be substantially efficient. This substantial efficiency is perfectly practicable to attain. The scheme contemplates a large reduction in the present number of Volunteers and Yeomanry provided for by the Army Estimates. This reduction will permit of the standard of efficiency being raised, and the screw put on to eliminate from the force those who do not reach that standard. Moreover, the sole responsibility for home defence will not fall on this force in the first few weeks of the war—possibly not for a couple of months. During that time the units will have been embodied, and their practical efficiency can be assured. It may be freely admitted that it would be satisfactory if England could enforce on Englishmen their old constitutional obligation of compulsory service for home defence. If the scheme now put forward prove impracticable, there is no other solution of the problem of the defence of the Empire but such compulsion; but there are grounds for hoping that the problem may be solved without a measure of that nature, the necessity for which will, perhaps, never be fully grasped by the nation unless it has suffered a serious disaster. Moreover, there can be no doubt that, at the outbreak of war with our continental neighbours, the whole nation would be moved by a strong military enthusiasm, and that every effort would be made by all individual Volunteers to attain efficiency. In fact, far from lacking men as recruits, the Government would be embarrassed by the large number that would offer their services. With a view to this, over and above the peace establishment of 350,000 men of the home defensive force, a reserve of equipment for at least another 100,000 should be always maintained in this country. The men, however, so raised should take the places of others in the home defence force, who may be allowed to volunteer for active service. Such Volunteers should not be organized in newly-raised corps, under inexperienced officers, but should be used as reinforcements to the army in the field, being sent out in separate companies or squadrons, as was done in the case of the Volunteers during the present war.

90. *Financial.*—Finally, it remains to be made clear that there is no insuperable financial obstacle to these proposals. It will have been observed that no increase,

except two Cypriot battalions, is contemplated in the existing units of the Regular Army. Any such increase would almost certainly be impracticable without a considerable augmentation of the soldiers' pay. Possibly such augmentation of pay may even, without any increase in the Army, be necessary in the future; but that is not entailed, either directly or indirectly, by the present scheme. The proposals now made involve an addition to the military expenditure of India, but this addition is essential to the safety of that possession, and its acceptance by India will, *pro tanto*, relieve the home Budget of the cost of 25 battalions of regular infantry and 21 artillery units. A further saving in the home Budget will also be effected by the reduction in the numbers of Volunteers and Yeomanry.

I don't think the idea of raising Cypriot battalions will come to anything.—W. G. N.

The proposals which entail increased expenditure from War Office votes are the raising of 2 Cypriot battalions, the embodying of the cadres of 33 half-battalions of Militia for eleven months in the year, and the equipment of certain new artillery units which it is proposed to raise.* Some expenditure may also be entailed by the demands for increased efficiency in the Militia, Imperial Yeomanry, and Volunteers, and the provision of reserve equipment; but it would seem clear that the annual charges entailed by all these proposals will be more than met by the annual saving above referred to. Moreover, it is to be noted that these proposals provide for South Africa a considerably larger force than that contemplated in the Estimates, and yet do not entail any increase in the Regular Army.

91. The formation of a reserve force available for foreign service after the dispatch from England of the offensive army has been already dealt with; but the provision of drafts to maintain at war strength the units on active service has only as yet been incidentally alluded to. It may be as well, therefore, to say that it is proposed that these should be furnished from three sources:—

(a.) The Army Reserve, to be maintained on its present lines.

(b.) The new "Militia Reserve," to be made available for foreign service in war.

(c.) A new reserve, to be formed from the Volunteer force. The experience of the present campaign has shown that a considerable number of Volunteers are willing in time of war to be sent abroad on active service, and that men of this type, when attached to Regular units, are efficient fighting soldiers. It is suggested that Volunteers, up to an establishment of 30,000, should be invited to enlist in a Volunteer Army Reserve, which would be regarded as a third reserve available for inclusion in drafts needed for the front in the latter stages of a campaign. Enlistment for this reserve should be for one year. No man should be allowed to enlist who is not an efficient Volunteer, a good shot, and physically qualified for active service. The men so enlisted should be additional to the establishment of the Volunteer Corps. They might receive an annual retaining fee of 5*l.*, in addition to the capitation and other allowances they may be entitled to as Volunteers. This reserve should be utilized to replenish the ranks of the fighting battalions of the territorial regiment to which the men belong.

92. The provision of a larger number of efficient reserve officers, to meet the demand for extra officers which a war of any magnitude entails, is one of the obvious necessities which the South African war has brought to light. It is understood that a scheme for such augmentation is under consideration in another department of the War Office. This matter, therefore, need not be dealt with in detail in the present paper.

93. Colonial contingents have been already referred to in paragraph 38, where the hope was expressed that such contingents might be available as reinforcements for India. No one who has studied the military needs of the Empire, and followed the course of the present war, can have failed to notice the vital importance of this factor in the future organization of a thoroughly sound system of Imperial defence. But the question is as yet only in its infancy. The South African war has shown that loyalty to the Empire and the will and capacity to fight for the mother country are not lacking in the daughter lands. But the help given, though satisfactory in its spontaneousness, was yet, at the commencement of the war, unorganized, and therefore could not be relied on in our strategic plans. Unless we know that, as soon as sea command is attained, we can absolutely direct from London, by telegram, the embarkation in Australia, Canada, or South Africa of so many thoroughly organized and efficient units for whatever destination we may need their services, colonial assistance may prove but a broken reed to lean on in a time of emergency. The day may come—there is no reason why it should not come—

* The idea has been definitely abandoned; but a proposal from Lord Kitchener to raise 4 Soudanese battalions for Imperial service is now under consideration.—E. A. January 16, 1903.

when 10,000 of such troops may be ready in Australia, 10,000 in South Africa, and 10,000 in Canada. A beginning has been already made by the recent legislation in New Zealand creating an Imperial Reserve, and it should be a matter of fixed policy with His Majesty's Government to foster in every way this movement; but it may be doubted whether, until Imperial Federation gives the Colonies a voice in the councils of the Empire, military assistance of this nature can be absolutely counted on, unless the financial expenditure entailed by its training and equipment in peace time is borne by the Imperial Government. In any case, the whole movement is too undeveloped as yet to form a reliable factor in the present scheme.

94. In conclusion it may be convenient to give a brief summary of the administrative changes which this scheme contemplates:—

- (a.) An increase in Indian Army of about 30,000 British troops.
- (b.) A slight increase in the garrison of Egypt.
- (c.) A reduction in the establishments of Volunteer and Yeomanry liable only to home service.
- (d.) The organization of an effective home defence force of 350,000 men.
- (e.) Militia and Militiamen to be liable to foreign service in war.
- (f.) The readjustment of our artillery units, and the creation of thirty field artillery units from the Militia and eighteen from the Volunteers, the whole to be liable to foreign service in war.
- (g.) The permanent embodiment of 33 half-battalions of Militia, as feeding units for line battalions abroad.
- (h.) The creation of a new Volunteer Army Reserve.
- (i.) An augmentation of the reserve of officers.
- (k.) The encouragement of the organization in Australia, Canada, and eventually South Africa of efficient contingents, which would be at the disposal in war of the Imperial authorities.

95. It is submitted that these measures will ensure the safety of the Empire as a whole in time of need, and would afford a reasonable prospect of bringing a great war to a successful conclusion.

Our present system has the radical defect of being over-concerned with purely insular defence, to the flagrant neglect of vital factors, such as the defence of India and Egypt, and the power of striking effective blows at the enemy. We are fortunate in having been taught this defect in the comparatively cheap object-lesson of the present war in South Africa. If the Venezuela incident of 1896, the West African dispute of 1898, or the Fashoda affair of 1899 had culminated in a war with one or more Great Powers, we should have paid a far bigger price for the knowledge that we have built up our military organization without sufficient consideration of the real needs of the Empire. The scheme now put forward has been worked out with special regard to the gravest contingency against which it is reasonable to make preparation; but the organization proposed would supply for the Empire an effective force to meet other possibilities, and, moreover, would give an appreciable value to our alliance in war, not merely as that of a great naval Power, but also as that of an ally, which, by virtue of its sea command, could choose its own point to strike at, and then throw into the scales at short notice an effective army of about 200,000 men. Even by Germany, aid of this description could not be despised, and would tend to make it more reasonable that she should support Great Britain in a war with Russia and France.

96. The reforms now proposed will need careful examination, and it is anticipated that such examination will bring to light detail which will require elaboration or amendment; but it is hoped that this paper has not flinched from looking facts in the face, and that it has succeeded in some measure in suggesting the outlines of a military policy which will save the Empire from terrible anxiety and possibly disaster when her hour of trial arrives.

(Signed) E. A. ALTHAM, D.A.A.G.

*Intelligence Division, War Office,
August 10, 1901.*

(Secret.)
D.G.M.I.,

I have not touched on the question of higher staffs in the enclosed papers, but it will be seen that, with a little adaptation, the scheme proposed would fit into the six Army Corps organization at home.

The scheme contemplates the forces in the United Kingdom, at the outbreak of war, being organized as follows:—

1. Covering Force for Biserta Expedition ..	}	1 Army Corps. 1 Cavalry Division.
2. Reinforcements for India		2 Army Corps.
3. Expeditionary Forces—		
(i.) Biserta		20,000
(ii.) Dakar		12,000
(iii.) Martinique		10,000
(iv.) Diego Suarez		19,000
(v.) Saigon		10,000
4. Home Defence Force divided into—		
(a.) Garrison of Defended Ports		About 200,000
(b.) Mobile Army		„ 150,000

It is suggested that, for purposes of command, these forces should be organized as follows:—

Biserta Army Corps and Cavalry Division		I Army Corps Command.
Indian Reinforcements		II and III Army Corps.
Biserta and Dakar Offensive Forces		IV Army Corps.
Diego Suarez	}	V Army Corps.
Saigon		
Martinique		
Mobile Army for Home Defence		VI Army Corps.

The garrisons of the defended ports would, in the more important cases, form separate commands, although some, *e.g.*, the Irish ports, might, on mobilization, be attached to an Army Corps command.

Prior to the embarkation of the offensive forces and reinforcements for India, some fresh staffs should be created in the United Kingdom for administrative purposes. The mobile army (home defence) would remain under the VI Army Corps Staff, which would expand into an Army Staff, and require under it some four Army Corps Staffs.

As regards the IV and V Army Corps Staff, they should proceed with the most important of their expeditionary forces, *i.e.*, Biserta and Diego Suarez.

An Army Staff would need adding for the supreme control of the Biserta force.

If these conclusions be accepted, the following staffs will be needed for the forces to be mobilized in England:—

<i>Peace.</i>	<i>War.</i>
6 Army Corps Staffs.	2 Army Staffs. 9 Army Corps Staffs.

These staffs would also fit in with the possible requirements of war under other contingencies than those contemplated in this paper.

(Signed)

E. A. ALTHAM, D.A.A.G.

August 12, 1901.

APPENDIX I.

GREAT BRITAIN IN A WAR AGAINST RUSSIA AND FRANCE COMBINED.

Introductory Remarks.

THE portions of the subject dealt with by Section "D" are as follows:—

(A.) The power of Russia, assisted by that of France, both in Europe and Asia.

(B.) All operations in Asia or elsewhere in which Indian troops may be required to take part.

It is understood that the matter is to be dealt with broadly, and without financial estimates, the object being to ascertain the real needs of the Empire in face of a strong European combination.

As regards (A):—

The question of war with Russia has been frequently considered and discussed, and a précis of the most important authoritative and official decisions and opinions has been prepared by Captain W. C. Black, I.S.C., and is attached (*vide* Appendix II). The papers summarized throw much valuable light on the various operations that have from time to time been studied; but in many cases new conditions have arisen which modify the conclusions formerly arrived at. These new conditions will be referred to in this Note.

Former opinions
re war with
Russia.

The addition of France to Russia has not hitherto been much considered. Her chief value to Russia would naturally be—

Difference made
by France.

(a.) Her fleet, making it difficult for us to move troops by sea.

(b.) She might be persuaded to attempt an invasion of the United Kingdom, or rather, perhaps, a "dash on London."

This concerns "D," in that the mere possibility necessitates the retention in England of troops that might otherwise be used elsewhere.

The Question of India.

Speaking broadly, so long as the Navy fulfils its mission, the British Empire is impervious to the great land forces of continental nations except in one point—India.

Our vulnerability.

Here alone can a fatal blow be dealt us. The loss of India by conquest would be a death-blow to our prosperity, prestige, and power. The damaging effects of even a near approach by hostile forces would be incalculable.

We cannot doubt, therefore, that, whatever else may be done or left undone, the greatest and most determined effort will be made by Russia against India.

Next in importance, then, and second only to the security of the United Kingdom itself, comes the question of the defence of India.

I do not propose to go into actual details of this very vexed question further than appears necessary for the general purposes of the question now before us, but seeing how great an influence our vulnerability here would undoubtedly have on the whole course of a war with France and Russia, it seems imperative to arrive at certain conclusions about it.

The defence of
India.

From the précis of past opinions attached hereto it will be seen that the gravity of the issues at stake has been fully realized, and although opinions differ as to the imminence of our danger, none deny Russia's power to move at once to positions which may debar us from seizing certain points we ought to get, and from which an invasion will become a practicable operation.

Earl Roberts, and practically every other high authority of Indian experience, has laid down that, for obvious political reasons, the war must be kept away from the Indian borders, and to do this there are certain strategic points we must occupy and deny to Russia, whether we find other action in Europe possible or not. For instance, when Russia advances to Herat, her outposts will be pushed at once to Farah and the Helmund on the west, and towards Bamian on the north. A large slice of Afghanistan would thus be in her possession almost in the time it takes to march the distances, and from Herat, Farah, and Afghan Turkestan she would be immediately in a position to impose her will on the Afghans, and turn them against us if no British columns were in

Necessity of a
forward position
for us.

evidence. I need not dilate on the uphill struggle that would follow, and the danger of discontent in India as the war approached our borders.

I have in other papers suggested means we can take to be first in the field* in South Afghanistan, which is, by a consensus of opinion, the line of principal danger. Besides the occupation of Candahar, and possibly Cabul, it will be necessary to forestall Russia on the Helmund, and, if possible, in Farah and Seistan as well, and thus start with the campaign in our favour, and the Afghans probably on our side, or, at least, hostile to either party. But for this, sufficient troops will have to be on the spot in India *from the beginning of the war*. It will be too late to wait for help from England, even if it is found possible to send any.

The question at issue, therefore, is: has India the troops to make a forward advance, show her power to the Afghans, and take such advantages as there may be in a forward position, and to maintain herself, perhaps, for several months?

Armed strength of India.

Her field army (assuming all back from South Africa and China), after leaving the approved "obligatory garrisons" to hold India, consists of two divisions in the first line, one at Peshawar and one at Quetta, with certain line-of-communication troops, and two divisions in reserve. Total, 75,030 men.

We may, perhaps, add to this all the Imperial service troops (these have no British officers)—16,000. The full total then comes to 91,030 men on the whole frontier, of which only 24,480† will be British (infantry and cavalry), to meet, quite possibly, both Russian and Afghans.

Afghanistan as a factor.

We must remember that the Afghans are now said to be able to arm at least 100,000 men with magazine rifles; they have modern artillery and machine-guns, and the country is infinitely more difficult than the Transvaal.

The Russian power.

The Russians, without our being aware of the date of their starting, can, at any time, place 50,000 to 60,000 men in Afghanistan, as the mere heads of their columns, to seize the most important strategic points, with countless numbers to follow, limited only by the total the theatre will support.

It is difficult, owing to the meagre data in our hands, to forecast at all accurately the numbers of troops Russia will bring into the field in Central Asia after her first movements which will put her in possession of Afghan Turkestan and Herat.

The troops must live as much as possible on the country, but they must be also assisted by lines of communication.

Numbers will, therefore, depend, to a great extent, on the size and quality of the different fertile areas of Afghanistan.

Roughly, there may be said to be three of these, viz., Afghan Turkestan, the Hari-Rud Valley, and Seistan and Farah.

Afghan Turkestan is probably, on the whole, the most productive, and would, no doubt, in time, support a large number of men and animals. It is, and must be, mere guesswork to say how many, but it has been put at one Army Corps the first year and two the second by officers who have visited the country.

But both ours and the Russians' experience in Asiatic warfare proves that living on the country means practically only forage for animals. Men cannot feed, if the columns are in movement, without a line of communication, and the troops in Northern Afghanistan would be very badly off for this.

In other words, although the road from Samarkand to Chushka Guzar may, and probably will, be used to form supply depôts and to march 10,000 to 15,000 men to take Mazar-i-Sharif and Northern Afghanistan, it cannot be considered, even assisted by the River Oxus and the road from Charjuï, a line by which large numbers could continue to be fed for their onward march to Bamian and Cabul. Nor would the enormous numbers of transport animals required be probably forthcoming.

It is for these and similar reasons, coupled with the significant fact that the Russians have never extended their railway from Charjuï to Kilif, that one is led to the conclusion that their main advance will be via Herat and Farah, and that no more than 40,000 to 50,000 men will be located in, or move forward from, Afghan Turkestan for some considerable time after the commencement of war.

Turning now to the other fertile areas. If opposition is to be met with from us in Seistan and Farah, those areas will be denied to the enemy, and they must at first, at any rate, concentrate all their forces and efforts about Herat. Here local supplies will be fewer, but to this point the railway should be working in two or three months from date of mobilization, and the forces here will thus depend on the carrying power of the line.

We calculate eight trains can run daily, conveying an average of about 2,000 men in five or six trains, leaving two or three trains daily for stores. This is a low estimate, and, as columns will probably be arriving also from Khorassan by march, we cannot be wrong in thinking that at least 2,000 men will be arriving daily at Herat and neighbourhood during the third and fourth months.

If, then, in the first two months, there are 50,000 in this part of the theatre, there will, at the end of the third month, be another 60,000, and, at the end of the fourth (remembering that more supply trains will be required) another, say, 40,000. Thus, in four months there may be some 150,000 men in the Herat-Farah theatre, and possibly 40,000 in the Mazar-i-Sharif-Hamian theatre, with, perhaps, 8,000 to 10,000 for demonstrations towards Chitral, Kashgar, &c., or a round total of 200,000 in the whole theatre.

This is always supposing that the railway, supplemented by Khorassan and other road supplies,

* A railway from Quetta towards Seistan.

† At the present moment some 8,000 are still in South Africa.

bear the strain, and that transport animals are sufficient for the large quantities of rations to be carried with the columns, and to these from the railhead.

I think, as a measure of precaution, we ought to be prepared for the full numbers I have given. If not in four, then in five or six months, they will be present on the Hindu Kush on the one hand, and on the Helmund on the other, with various railway extensions in process of being energetically pushed up to them.

By calling up her reserves Russia could safely spare much more than these numbers from Europe for an advance towards India, under the conditions contemplated in this note, while for supplies she would draw on the Caucasus and South Russia—the richest portions of her country.

Obviously, India would need heavy reinforcements to meet the requirements of a modern war.

How strong these will have to be it is hard to say at this stage.

If we decide to leave only a watching force in the passes opposite Cabul, and adopt the strategy originally recommended by Lord Roberts in 1888 of one main base, and advance by South Afghanistan, we shall, of course, need less, and if we have provided ourselves with railway extensions and material beyond Quetta, less again, as we shall be more mobile, and altogether in a better position.

Even if we decided to forego all the advantages of any forward movement at all, and openly confess our weakness by remaining within our own borders,* India would need help before very long, unless, of course, such decisive operations in Europe or Transcaspia should meanwhile have taken place as to draw Russia off or cripple her in Europe.

(A.)—OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA IN EUROPE, &C.

We may now proceed to consider the question of operations against Russia outside India. Various plans considered.

Various plans have been suggested.

They divide into two groups:—

1. Operations in Asia Minor, based on the Mediterranean or Black Sea or Persian Gulf against Transcaucasia, with the object of severing Russia's communications with Turkestan.

2. Operations against Vladivostock, to which may now, of course, be added Port Arthur and the Manchurian and Siberian railways, which have not yet been considered.

No. 2 may be dismissed for the present. No blow struck in the Far East would relieve pressure on India, nor so fatally injure the Russian Empire as to force an early and advantageous conclusion to the war. Vladivostock, Port Arthur, &c.

Vladivostock is now almost impregnable, and the combined rail and river steam route through Siberia enables Russia to send help to the already powerful forces she now maintains in the East,† forces that were never, I imagine, contemplated by the advocates of "Russia bleeding to death through Vladivostock."

Port Arthur and the Manchurian railway, though also open to the above objections, might be an objective worth considering later in the campaign, with Japan as our ally, but we have yet to determine if we should have any troops to spare, and how they can be moved; also whether there are not more important directions in which to employ them.

We may turn our attention, therefore, to group 1: Offensive Operations against Transcaucasia. Asia Minor.

In this direction also conditions are so completely altered that even the very doubtful promise of success formerly held out must be abandoned.

Formerly, Russia's communications with Central Asia could be cut at once by the occupation of Baku, or any point on the Baku-Tiflis railway.

Now her communications are unassailable. They would, in war, lie north of the Caucasus range, altogether via Petrovsk.

Again, formerly Russia could reinforce her Transcaucasus troops only by marching through the mountains.

Now, the Petrovsk-Derbend-Baku railway puts Tiflis, Kars, and Erivan in direct communication with Moscow, and enables her to concentrate her numbers with a rapidity that was never formerly thought of.

Russia has now in the Caucasus military district alone some 103,875 active troops, and with the first and second-category reserves called out, and all defensive units included, 291,173 men, 858 guns, and 240 siege guns. Armed strength of Russia in the Caucasus.

These troops she could reinforce by three more Army Corps (126,000) of active troops, and an equal number of first and second reserves, without moving a man from her western frontier or calling out her third reserves—the "opolchenie," or general call to arms.

Turkey, I am told, could in a month have some 108,000 men in line on her own border in Asia Minor, with, perhaps, double this in two months; but they are not mobile, nor is the Turkish Turkey. Offensive power of Turkey.

* This policy is universally condemned in unmeasured terms by all authorities.

† Present numbers in the Pri-Amur military district, i.e., east of Lake Baikal (not counting troops likely to return to Europe), well over 100,000.

army in any sense a weapon of offence. Nor, again, are we at all certain that Turkey would be our ally—rather the contrary.

Finally, there is the all-important fact to remember that with the combined French and Russian navies against us we might find it impossible to transport any troops by sea at all, or keep up a long sea line of communication.

It seems hardly necessary to continue. The best we could now expect from an alliance with Turkey would be the harassing of Russia's southern frontier and the containing of a certain number of troops that would otherwise go to swell the total advancing on India.

Even with both Germany and Turkey on our side, it would appear that we should best serve our own interest and the general progress of the campaign by using the bulk of our land power in India, advancing slowly from there with strategic or light railways, and driving Russia back, inflicting such losses as we could while covering our own vitals at the same time.

The question now, therefore, reduces itself to this: If no operations west of the Caspian or in the Far East can hope to relieve India or cripple Russia in Europe, the latter will be at liberty to devote her entire attention to India, and this, of course, correspondingly increases our danger there, and the numbers of reinforcements we must arrange to place there.

But there is more than this involved. If we can meet Russia at no other point than India, we are forced to the conclusion that it is here alone that we must endeavour to inflict such injuries by *offensive action* as we may, in order to bring about, through final exhaustion, if nothing else, a favourable peace.

I am aware that offensive operations from our present frontier in India are open to objections on the score of acting at the end of a long and dangerous line of communications over an unproductive country; but the policy I would advocate would be that so successfully practised by our opponent, viz., a gradual advance and consolidation of our military power round (if we cannot go into) South Afghanistan. It is desert country in parts, but railways overcome deserts, and South Persia begins at Seistan. We have strong interests there, and an important part of our preparations should be to prevent Russia encircling Afghanistan and reaching the Indian frontier, and at the same time the Indian Ocean, by Seistan and South Persia.

(B.)—OTHER OPERATIONS IN WHICH INDIA MAY HAVE TO TAKE PART.

Operations against French Colonies, &c.

We must now turn our attention to France, and examine what other considerations of Imperial strategy in Asia demand attention.

So far, I have practically considered "defence" only, and the actual danger the Empire is exposed to in the portions of the world dealt with by "D" section. It appears that there is no fatal danger, except from Russia, to India. (For Hong-Kong, see p. 55.)

France cannot fatally injure us outside Europe. Operations against her will, therefore, be mainly of an offensive character.

It has been pointed out to me by Colonel Altham that it might be advisable to concentrate our energies against France and crush her first, and this, besides being good general strategy, has the great advantage of clearing our sea routes, and thus securing our commerce and food supply and the movement of troops by sea. To do it, we must attack and take her Colonies, naval bases, or other "thorns in our side," by land and sea.

Fields of operations which naturally suggest themselves are—

Diego Suarez and Réunion.
Indo-China.
Algeria.
Smaller places, such as Djibouti, &c.

I am concerned with these only in so far that it has been laid down that the troops to attack French possessions—except, perhaps, Algeria—would be drawn from India.

It will occur at once to the reader that after what has already been advanced as to the weakness of India to defend herself from Russia, she would have very little force to spare for anything else.

This is the actual fact. Moreover, at least one of the French ports—Diego Suarez—which we have long looked upon as most necessary for us to attack, is now very strong, and would take a large force to capture. Yet it might obviously be highly desirable to effect some injury by land, at some period of the war, against French possessions, the majority of which are most conveniently reached from India.

Present Distribution of British Power.

This brings us to the two fundamental points of the whole problem:—

(I.) What are the general assets of the British Empire in the way of land troops?

(II.) Are they conveniently distributed for their duties in war? If not, can they be transported by sea to threatened points, or for offensive expeditions?

Germany and Turkey as our Allies.

Deductions as to operations in Europe.

Offensive operations from India.

Desirability of attacking France first.

Possible operations.

No troops available from India.

Diego Suarez.

Point (I) is out of my province to discuss in detail ; but it is to be hoped that in any future arrangements a force will be available for operations outside the country over and above those required to secure the United Kingdom from invasion. There would also, of course, be innumerable enlistments in England of men out of employ and others in case of war.

There should be, undoubtedly, therefore, a surplus in England, which would increase as the war went on.

There is also a surplus of the very best material in the greater Colonies. Finally, there is a certain surplus of native material in India, providing that British troops were increased *pari passu*.

As regards point (II) :—

It has been shown that the British garrison of India is inadequate as it stands even for the proper defence of the country, putting aside all questions of offensive operations, on which the termination of the war will depend, and in which India, from her position, is best calculated to assist.

It is also more than probable that on the outbreak of war there would be calls for help from other portions of the Empire, *e.g.*, Egypt, the Mediterranean, Hong-Kong, &c. These calls will, as matters now stand, all fall on England, India, instead of helping, being one of the greatest claimants.

The insecurity of Hong-Kong results from its situation between, and within a few days' steam of, Port Arthur on the one hand and Hanoi on the other. This lays it open to attack in case of a temporary British naval inferiority in Far Eastern waters, or the absence of our fleet.

Against a combined expedition of Russian and French troops landed in the neighbourhood, the British garrison would have an extensive perimeter to defend, and the place might fall. The loss of our principal naval base in this part of the world, with all its stores and material, would, of course, be very serious.

Naturally, the attempt to take it would be open to the usual dangers of invasion against a Naval Power, *viz.*, that on the reassertion of our maritime supremacy the enemy are trapped ; but in the case of Hong-Kong there is this difference, that, *if the place had fallen*, we could not retake it with the Navy, and the enemy might continue to hold it in comfort till the end of the war.

As regards troops, it will be evident from the numbers given on p. 53 that Russia has plenty available in the Far East. Port Arthur we must count as being in through rail communication with all the troops of Manchuria and Pri-Amur.

Fifteen thousand Russians could be carried in seven or eight of the volunteer fleet steamers, and there is the French contingent to be considered as well.

It would be losing the ship for a ha'porth of tar not to have Hong-Kong sufficiently garrisoned in peace time, for no help might be possible to it from India or elsewhere.

The question that remains, then, is: Can England, on the outbreak of war, dispatch the necessary reinforcements to India and elsewhere?

We are told to assume, in these papers, that no troops can be sent by sea, and it is quite obvious that at the outset of war the dispatch of these in large numbers to various remote parts of the Empire, would be an operation so difficult, risky, and costly, as to absorb all our energies and resources, and a good deal of our naval power as well, to the exclusion of all other enterprises against the enemy.

It may thus turn out, as matters stand now, that in case of war the bulk of our troops may be standing useless and unable to move in England while other portions of the Empire are in danger of perishing. It is open to question, therefore, whether, even on the most general grounds, and as a matter of pure self-preservation, it is prudent to lock up all our surplus in the United Kingdom, or whether, in spite of all climatic, financial, and other drawbacks, a certain proportion should not be located in India, England, or the whole Empire, if necessary, contributing to the cost.

General Conclusions drawn and Measures advocated.

It appears, at any rate, to be established that if we cannot reinforce India on the outbreak of war her garrison must be sufficient in peace for all eventualities.

Could India be made strong enough not only to look after herself, but to be a radiating centre of force, instead of, as now, an anxiety to the Empire, most Imperial problems would be solved.

England would be relieved of her chief embarrassment and free to send help (when she could safely do so) to the Mediterranean, or Egypt, or elsewhere, leaving all east of Suez to be dealt with by India and the Colonies (see p. 56) including the destruction of French power in Asia and on the east of Africa.

Our enemies could not tell where we meant to strike, and the sea-transport question would be greatly simplified not only on this account, but because movements in Indian and Australian waters would possibly be a very different matter to long sea journeys from England through European waters, where the enemies' ships will be more numerous and on the watch.

Finally, we should not only gain, as above described, in war, but the mere moral effect of having spare troops in India in peace time would so greatly raise our position and prestige as to probably enable us to avoid war altogether. For want of evidence of offensive power in Asia to back up our interests we are, in spite of our preponderating trade, slowly but surely losing ground. All nations have their interests in that continent now fully aroused and "incidents" will become more and more frequent in the future.

Our surplus.

Present distribution leaves India too weak.

Possibly also other garrisons.

Vulnerability of Hong-Kong.

India, &c., cannot be reinforced.

Surplus should be re-distributed.

India to be independent of reinforcements at outbreak of war.

Results of a margin of troops in India.

Numbers of increase required.	<p>In 1888 Lord Roberts gave it as his opinion that, failing any outside operations in Europe, the British troops in India ought to be increased by 30,000 men, and in view of the present conditions, as advanced in this Memorandum, and our late experience in South Africa, the number appears none too many.</p>
How to be provided : (1) Suggestion for a white military police.	<p>There is, however, a suggestion which I laid before the Director of Military Intelligence in the early stages of the Boer war for indirectly strengthening India, should the necessity arise. I pointed out that of the total Indian Army of roughly 200,000, no less than 125,000 (excluding volunteers, national military police, and levies) were, in case of war, detained in India as obligatory garrisons, leaving only 75,000 for the Field Army. The suggestion was that it was a waste of fully trained fighting regiments to keep them on guard over the unarmed natives in the bazaars of the great towns, and that most of this work could be much better intrusted to a white military police armed with rifles.</p> <p>Something towards expenses would be gained by the reduction of the numbers of the present native police, who do many acts in our name prejudicial to our rule. No one will deny the calming effect of a few English police on an Indian mob.</p> <p>The men for this constabulary could consist partly of old soldiers and partly of men engaged for long service. Colonials would form excellent material, should they be allowed to join.</p> <p>Eight thousand or 10,000 of these would set free five or six times their number of trained troops (especially native regiments) for the Field Army.</p> <p>I, however, merely put forward the suggestion for what it is worth. It is, above all, an unostentatious method of raising our power. India's need is white men, and I do not see why in these days, when the British garrison of India may have at any time, and <i>does have</i>, as witness South Africa and China, extensive military duties outside the country, it is necessary or advisable to hold India only with British soldiers, when British police could do a large portion of the work equally well.</p> <p>Our prestige in the eyes of European nations has suffered enormously from our being unable to show any British troops in China; and the China question may repeat itself any day.</p> <p>The military police scheme above proposed would appear, therefore, to have certain very material advantages.</p>
(2) Increase of British troops by 30,000.	<p>In addition to the constabulary, however, India would also need a substantial increase of British troops if she is to fulfil her mission in the Empire. I think it will be acknowledged that 20,000 to 30,000 would not be felt from the surplus which it is hoped is to be kept up in Great Britain in future. It would, perhaps, be prudent to have fully 30,000 of these allotted to India; but the opinions of the Indian authorities would, of course, be necessary.</p>
Increase of native troops.	<p>A third addition of strength of course accrues to India by the increase of the British garrison in that, as long as the proportion is maintained, she can, on the near approach of war, utilize her own Indian material by raising more native troops.</p> <p>As, however, the proportion of British troops, even as increased, would still be very low, the question of raising further native regiments could, to avoid expense, well be put off till the absolute necessity arose. It could, of course, be done at any time.</p>
Supply of British officers.	<p>But the question of a sufficiency of British officers for the Native Army should not be put off. This is a question second only in importance to the increase of the British garrison itself. There should be a wide margin for the native reserves and further troops raised in war and for the Imperial Service troops. (I believe this matter is receiving attention.)</p>
Reliability of native troops.	<p>The quality of native troops against a European enemy depends entirely upon the number and class of their English officers. Well officered, these troops have a dexterity and mobility in war which should eminently fit them for the kind of operations that will be required in Central Asia; but, of course, the moral effect on the enemy of meeting mostly natives has to be taken into account.</p>
Necessity of strategic railways.	<p>The next important measure that appears necessary is the development of our railway system on the north-west frontier towards Seistan.</p> <p>Failing extensions into Afghanistan, which the Ameer and his people will not permit, a line from Quetta has been advocated, in other papers, and the principal reasons have been referred to herein, viz., to assist us to take up a forward position to check Russia in Central Asia, and to threaten her flank and prevent her ousting us from South Persia in the future. It would also be from the terminus of some such line that we should attempt offensive operations in Central Asia, should we find Russia can be defeated in no other way. The railway will also develop considerable trade. Indian reports are full of the excellent results already obtained by the Quetta-Nushki-Seistan caravan route.</p>
Results of above measures.	<p>With the above measures, India may be fairly considered to be safe for some time after the commencement of hostilities; she might even be in a position to furnish a certain number of troops for other operations that would benefit us at the moment and which would soon be finished. If, however, we find we have eventually to concentrate our efforts against Russia, and end the war by operations in Central Asia, India would, for the final operations, have to be largely reinforced again. By this time, however, either our naval supremacy would be complete or we should have to come to terms.</p>
Further help to India for final struggle.	<p>I refer to the matter of the Colonies here because I think a plan should be considered for approaching the Colonies on the subject of their share in Imperial defence.</p> <p>Australia and New Zealand are excellently situated for either reinforcing India or combining with her for operations against hostile Colonies, bases, &c. I would, however, go a step further than this, and ask if there is any good reason why Australia, Canada, and New Zealand should not contribute a part of the Indian garrison in time of peace as a regular thing. There could be</p>
Share the Colonies might take in this.	

no better training ground for such regular regiments as they may decide to keep up, and it would have the best of moral effects on the world.

Concluding Remarks.

In concluding, I would remark that this Note lays no claim to be exhaustive, nor to have broken much new ground.

Under the conditions propounded, viz., no alliance with European Powers, and no possibility of transporting troops by sea, the main conclusions were foregone ones.

With our troops distributed as now, not only are Russia and France safe from fatal injury from us (for the Navy alone can never end the war), but we ourselves are liable to serious injury in India, and perhaps other portions of the Empire as well. In India, 24,000 British troops are not a sufficient proportion to defend that country against a European enemy, or even to enable India to take up a position and act in Afghanistan on Russia's next advance, or in case of internal troubles in Afghanistan.

Therefore, as the conditions are quite possible, and even likely ones, it would appear that the time has come to redistribute our surplus, to the extent, at any rate, of reinforcing India with white men *while we may*.

I would explain that the reason I have laid particular stress on this point is that when the question of reinforcing India was last discussed, viz., in 1892, it was plainly indicated to India that no reinforcements at all from England were to be relied on by her either before or during war.

The correspondence will be found in the précis attached (pp. 24 to 32).

It will be observed that Lord Roberts, who was then Commander-in-chief in India, specifically stated that India would have to be reinforced in war by 30,000 British troops, nor did he believe (p. 26 of précis) in the possibility of any operations west of the Caspian materially relieving pressure on India.

Earlier, in 1888 (see p. 60 of précis), Lord Roberts advocated offensive measures in Central Asia.

Authorities in England, however, from about 1885 to 1890, considered that our only chances in a war with Russia were to attack her in Europe, in alliance with Turkey, and there can be no doubt that it was with the idea of some such action that the decision was come to not to reinforce the Indian garrison, which was presumably to "stand on the defensive."

The danger is that adherence to plans of this kind, which depend on uncertain factors, such as alliances, &c., is likely to result in neglect of the actual existing danger in Central Asia, and we are liable to find ourselves weak at this point where, whatever else happens, we know we *must* fight Russia.

No reference has been made so far to Russia's next railway scheme, viz., the joining of Orenburg to Tashkent. The line is not built yet; but it is surveyed and approved, and is to be begun at both ends and completed in four years. Our Military Attaché at St. Petersburg believes it is already begun at the Orenburg end.

The Orenburg-
Tashkent Railway.

I mention it to show how conditions may alter and render abortive plans on which we might be tempted to rely for attacking our opponent's communications.

(Signed) E. PEACH, D.A.A.G.

Military Intelligence Division (D),
May 31, 1901.

SHORT SUMMARY OF DECISIONS, &c.—(continued).

Date.	Summary.	Authorship.
1887 (continued).	<p>II. "On the whole, we have no doubt that, from the military as well as the political point of view, Candahar should be occupied at once as a counter-move to Russia's annexation of Herat." The simultaneous occupation of the Jellalabad Valley is likewise advocated, but "altogether, looking to the state of things which would then obtain, the costliness of the occupation of Afghanistan and the growing excitement and unrest, which would probably be manifested throughout India; the strain involved, military, political, and financial, on England, as well as India, would be so great that, inasmuch as all this labour and outlay would at best only stave off war, we believe it would be the lesser evil to go to war as soon as Russia advances beyond the present frontier."</p> <p>III. "Policy, which we believe to be the wisest, safest, and least costly that can be adopted." Assuming that on the outbreak of war, Russia would straightway occupy Herat and Balkh, our line of action must be the immediate occupation of Candahar, the extension of the railway to that point, and other steps to ensure the Candahar-Cabul line, as a means of lateral communication. Short of Candahar and Cabul, it would be desirable to draw Russia as far as possible into Afghanistan. But in case she decides to await the further course of events north of the Hindu Kush, a vigorous offensive must be assumed, the main object being to sever Russia's communications between Turkestan and the Caspian.</p> <p>Two lines of action possible :—</p> <p>(1.) Viâ Cabul upon Turkestan.</p> <p>(2.) Viâ Candahar upon Herat.</p> <p>(1) need not be seriously considered: the physical difficulties would be very great, and the effect of a defeat would be less disastrous to Russia as regards her communications than would be the case in a repulse in the direction of Herat, being nearer the Caspian.</p> <p>For (2), 60,000 men, including those required to keep up communication between Herat and Candahar, could, in the first instance, be taken forward until the railway from Candahar had been pushed on. To maintain these men at the front 30,000 more would be required about Candahar and in reserve, and 30,000 on the Jellalabad-Cabul line. Total, 120,000, of whom half would be British, 30,000 being furnished by the Indian garrison and 30,000 being sent from England.</p> <p>Four other lines of operation against Russia :—</p> <p>(1.) Based on the Black Sea, to attack Russia's line of communication with Trans-Caspia.</p> <p>(2.) Based on the Mediterranean, in the Gulf of Iskanderun, to move on to the Russo-Turkish frontier.</p> <p>(3.) Based on the Persian Gulf, to move by the Tigris and Euphrates Valley.</p> <p>(4.) Based on the Persian Gulf, to move on Tehran and threaten Russia's communications.</p>	Indian Mobilization Committee—(continued).

SHORT SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL DECISIONS, &c.—(continued).

Date.	Summary.	Authorship.
August 1888.	<p>Three lines of action discussed :—</p> <p>(i.) To assume a vigorous offensive through Afghanistan, without attempting expeditionary operations elsewhere.</p> <p>(ii.) To combine offensive action from India, with expeditionary operations elsewhere (supposing our army sufficiently large).</p> <p>(iii.) To maintain a defensive attitude in India, and attack Russia elsewhere than through Afghanistan.</p> <p>(iii) is objected to on the plea that "a defensive attitude in India would undoubtedly lead to very grave internal troubles; it would destroy the confidence of the native army and civil population, and undermine our prestige and supremacy in the East; further, instead of turning our available military resources to the best account, such a policy would render a large proportion of them inert."</p> <p>(ii), if feasible, would be worthy of adoption, as combining all the advantages of (i) with the additional advantage of engaging Russia elsewhere. But this course is at present impossible, owing to the numerical weakness of our Army.</p> <p>Five possible directions in which operations could be undertaken are—</p> <p>(1.) Based on the Black Sea, to attack Russia's line of communications with Trans-Caspia.</p> <p>(2.) Based on the Mediterranean, in the Gulf of Iskanderun, to move on to the Russo-Turkish frontier, and threaten Russia's communications with Trans-Caspia.</p> <p>(3.) Based on the Persian Gulf, to move by the Tigris and Euphrates Valley routes, as in (2).</p> <p>(4.) Based on the Persian Gulf, to move on Tehran and threaten Russia's communications across the Caspian and in Trans-Caspia.</p> <p>(5.) Based on the Pacific Ocean, to attack the Russian possessions at Vladivostock.</p> <p>(1), (2), and (3) could only be carried out with Turkey as our ally, and, to some extent, (3) and (4) would depend on the line of action adopted by Persia.</p> <p>(5) "cannot be considered a really vulnerable point of attack."</p> <p>In discussing (i) (a vigorous offensive in Afghanistan), the attitude of the Afghans and border tribes is taken into account. "Unless we make use of the Afghans the Russians will be sure to do so, as they have already utilized the less warlike, but equally unstable, Turkoman tribes.</p> <p>Our relations with the border tribes between India and Afghanistan must be placed upon a sound and sure footing.</p> <p>Our offensive capabilities may be examined under three conditions :—</p> <p>(1.) With 30,000 men as reinforcement from England, and with the support of the Afghans and frontier tribes.</p>	<p>Sir F. Roberts.</p> <p><i>NOTE traced - in Roberts collection</i></p>

SHORT SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL DECISIONS, &C.—(continued).

Date.	Summary.	Authorship.
<p>August 1888 —(continued).</p>	<p>(2.) With only such troops from England as would maintain the army in the field, and the support of the Afghans and frontier tribes.</p> <p>(3.) With the Afghans and frontier tribes against us.</p> <p>(1) would give 60,000 men for advanced operations, with 30,000 about Candahar, and about a like number to guard the right flank of the frontier.</p> <p>Desirable to restrict our offensive action to one line of advance, with one base and one undivided command. Quetta, in first instance, to be continued viâ Candahar and Herat.</p> <p>Under (2), 80,000 to 90,000 troops could be placed in the field, some 55,000 (25,000 British) for advanced operations and corps of observations in the neighbourhood of Peshawur and another holding Candahar.</p> <p>Under (3) "any forward movement beyond the Helmund would be well-nigh impossible, and our operations would have to be confined to holding the Candahar Province and the line of the Hindu Kush, and opening up communication thence to Ghazni, and between Ghazni and India. If securely established at Candahar, Kelat-i-Ghilzai and Ghazni, we should menace the advance of Russia on and beyond Cabul, and directly meet any forward movement based on Herat and Khorassan."</p>	<p>Sir F. Roberts— (continued).</p>
<p>19 August 1889.</p> <p>wo p 10 page 20</p> <p>wo p 10 page 23</p> <p>wo p 10 page 27.</p>	<p>War with Russia.—An alliance with the <u>Porte</u> strongly advocated. "By no other means than the aid of the Turks can Great Britain ever hope to dispose of a sufficient force to attack Russia by land at any point west of the Caspian." An alliance with China also of value, compelling Russia to retain troops in Turkestan, and making a diversion in the Amur district.</p> <p>The policy (to attack Russia at Herat) advocated in the Memorandum by the Indian Mobilization Committee of 1887, is condemned "as in the very highest degree dangerous and unsound." "The Indian Army could not attack Herat with any prospect of success, except under the same conditions which would render possible a Russian advance on Candahar, that is, by slow approaches, a gradual consolidation of her power in the intervening country, the completion of railway communication, and the formation of large depôts of stores and munitions of war on the line of advance."</p> <p>Policy of inaction deprecated, the only remaining line of action being "an advance into Afghanistan simultaneously, or following upon a Russian advance beyond her present frontier." Russia must never be allowed to occupy Cabul and Candahar. "An advance of Russia to Herat and into Afghan Turkestan must be met, whether we do or do not make it a <i>casus belli</i> by a corresponding advance on our part to Candahar and Jellalabad, and possibly Ghazni."</p>	<p>Memorandum: Lieutenant-General Brackenbury and Major-General Newmarch.</p> <p>Approved by Secretaries of State for War and India, April 30, 1890.</p> <p>True.</p> <p>wo p 10 page 19.</p> <p>see wo p 97</p>

SHORT SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL DECISIONS, &c.—(continued).

Date.	Summary.	Authorship.
June 1890.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Russia cannot, with any reasonable prospect of success, invade British India from her present base in Central Asia. 2. Russia will, at the first favourable opportunity, advance beyond her present frontier into Afghanistan. 3. Russia can, with ease, and with her available forces in Central Asia, occupy Herat, Balkh, and Afghan Turkestan. 4. If Russia advances to Herat and Balkh, we must advance into Southern Afghanistan. 5. We cannot, with any reasonable prospect of success, advance to meet Russia at Herat, or north of Cabul beyond the Hindu Kush. 6. If we acquiesce in the occupation of Herat and Afghan Turkestan by Russia, the invasion of British India from those bases will, in course of time, become practicable. 7. The numerical strength of Russia's army is so great that to provide against such invasion India will then have to increase her army to more than double its present strength. 8. The strain upon India's military and financial resources will then be such that the question whether it is worth while to retain India will become a question of practical politics. 9. The only way to prevent this situation from arising is to make war successfully against Russia in other theatres than that of Central Asia—when she advances into Northern Afghanistan. 10. We can inflict no such serious injury upon Russia by means of our Navy alone as would bring about a favourable peace. 11. We can, by our own joint naval and military forces, without assistance from other Powers, capture Vladivostock. 12. The capture of Vladivostock and of all Russia's possessions in the Pacific would not bring about a favourable peace. 13. Nowhere else can we, with our own naval and military forces only, inflict such a serious injury on Russia as would bring about a favourable peace. 14. The numerical strength of Russia's army is so great that we could not, with reasonable prospect of success, attack her anywhere in Europe with our own troops alone. 15. All military and strategical conditions show that the only way for us to make war successfully against Russia, and to prevent her advancing against India, is to attack her in the Caucasus from a base in the Black Sea. 16. We cannot attack Russia in the Caucasus, or establish a base in the Black Sea, without the alliance Turkey. 17. With the alliance of Turkey alone we could make war on Russia in the Caucasus with a reasonable prospect of success and of bringing about a favourable peace. 	<p>Lieutenant-General Sir H. Brackenbury.</p> <p>Strongly approved of by Lord Wolseley, June 12, 1890.</p> <p><i>Not traced</i></p>

SHORT SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL DECISIONS, &c.—(continued).

Date.	Summary.	Authorship.
June 1890— (continued).	<p>18. For the above reasons the alliance of Turkey is indispensable for preventing the occurrence of the situation described in paragraphs 6, 7, 8—unless we have the European Powers forming the Triple Alliance on our side.</p> <p>19. Every effort to obtain the alliance of Turkey should be made, no matter what the cost of obtaining it.</p> <p>20. If this alliance, as stated by Lord Salisbury in his letter of the 26th August, 1889, can never be obtained, our only hope lies in casting in our lot with the Triple Alliance, in the event of war, on the condition that our Asiatic interests be taken into account, on the conclusion of a favourable peace; and in such war occurring before Russia has had time to prepare new bases in Northern Afghanistan.</p>	Lieutenant-General Sir H. Brackenbury—(continued).
November 1890.	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Diego-Suarez.</i></p> <p>The dispatch of reinforcements to India via the Cape of Good Hope would largely depend on the state of affairs at Diego-Suarez and Réunion. In the hands of the French as enemies, the route could not be regarded as secure.</p> <p>“ . . . It is of the utmost importance that Diego-Suarez especially and Réunion, being the only French defended coaling stations between Dakar and Saigon, should be attacked, and their defences, armaments, and naval and military stores be captured and destroyed at as early a stage of a war with France as possible.”</p> <p>On account of the distance (8,000 miles) from England, it is desirable, if possible, that the expedition for the above operations should come from India, “it being understood that from none of the British colonial possessions can a sufficient force be drawn for the purpose.”</p> <p>After the capture of the garrisons of these places, and the destruction of the defences, &c., it might not be necessary to leave at them any portion of the expeditionary force for their permanent occupation. “In this case, the absence of the force from India would be of comparatively short duration.”</p> <p>It would probably be impracticable for the French to re-establish themselves at Diego-Suarez and Réunion in time of war.</p>	Conference: Lieutenant-General Sir H. Brackenbury, D.M.I.; Major-General O. R. Newmarch, M.S., India Office; Captain C. A. G. Bridge, R.N., D.N.I.
August 1889.	<p style="text-align: center;">QUESTION OF REINFORCEMENTS FOR INDIA.</p> <p>Estimated that for the occupation of Candahar a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, with a proportion of corps artillery and ammunition columns of the First Army Corps, would be necessary; a similar force would suffice for both Jellalabad and Ghuzni.</p> <p>The total of these forces would be—</p> <p style="text-align: center;">15,170 British troops. 17,692 native „ 102 guns.</p>	Memorandum by Lieutenant-General Sir H. Brackenbury and Major-General O. R. Newmarch. <i>Transd</i> Concurred in by the Secretary of State for War and his military advisers.

Untransd but
see WO 9102.

see WO 97-10.

SHORT SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL DECISIONS, &c.—(continued).

Date.	Summary.	Authorship.
<p>August 1889 —(continued).</p>	<p>There would then be available for use on either line, if required, an Army Corps of 30,890 men, with 96 guns, and a reserve of—</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">3 battalions British infantry. 24 " native " 2 regiments British cavalry. 10 " native " 14 batteries artillery.</p> <p>after providing for garrisons in India, and without counting certain native corps under the Government of India, or the native States' contingents.</p> <p>"The present army of India is sufficient for all the requirements of the present time."</p> <p>India's true policy is to "improve communications with the frontier, to complete the fortified positions, to develop the resources of the frontier provinces, to bring the tribes beyond the frontier under our influence . . ."</p> <p>The Government of India "should clearly understand that for any operations short of actual invasion of her frontiers by Russia it must rely entirely upon Indian resources, and that no reserve for India, beyond the drafts necessary to complete the British units to Indian established strength, is maintained in this country. In the event of threatened invasion, the Secretary of State for War has stated in his letter to India Office of 5th April, 1887, that India may rely upon every possible assistance being afforded to her by this country. Beyond this general assurance, we consider His Majesty's Government cannot be expected to give any formal pledge for the supply of a definite number of troops at any particular time or for any specific operation."</p>	<p>Memorandum by Lieutenant-General Sir H. Brackenbury and Major-General O. R. Newmarch—(continued).</p>
<p>August 1889.</p> <p>See wo p 13-4.</p>	<p>The policy of advancing to Herat to fight the Russians is condemned in the strongest terms.</p> <p>The main outline of policy advocated is as follows: On Russia advancing upon either Herat or Balkh, war should be declared, when, "without drawing a soldier from England," Candahar should be occupied with 15,000 men, the line of the Helmand held, and the railway to Candahar completed.</p> <p>The Jalalabad Valley should be occupied by a force of about 5,000 men, and a similar force on the road between it and Peshawur. "As long as matters remain in their present position, I think all that is required is that we should be able at any time to move forward 30,000 men to Candahar and Jellalabad."</p> <p>". . . . I believe the army now in India is amply strong enough to furnish the 30,000 men whom, I think, we should require for these forward moves. I think it most important she should have all her mobilization schemes based upon the understanding that whilst in the event of any internal excitement she could count upon the assistance of all our army, in the event of a war with Russia she can look for no reinforcements from home as long as the war lasts."</p>	<p>Memorandum by Lord Wolseley.</p> <p><i>Tracecl.</i></p>

SHORT SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL DECISIONS, &c.—(continued).

Date.	Summary.	Authorship.																														
September 1891. <i>See wo p 19 at end</i>	Sir F. Roberts estimates (Minute of the 8th June, 1891) that to hold the Cabul-Candahar alignment, without attempting actively offensive operations beyond the Hindu Kush, would require the following force:—	Government of India No. 180, Secret, of September 15, 1891, forwarding Minutes by Sir F. Roberts of June 8, 1891, and August 26, 1891.																														
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>British.</th> <th>Native.</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Cabul and outposts in its vicinity ...</td> <td>15,000</td> <td>15,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Candahar</td> <td>15,000</td> <td>15,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ghuzni and Kelat-i-Ghilzai</td> <td>10,000</td> <td>10,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Communications between—</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td> Cabul and Peshawur</td> <td>5,000</td> <td>10,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Candahar and Quetta</td> <td>3,000</td> <td>6,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Total</td> <td>48,000</td> <td>56,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Obligatory garrisons in India</td> <td>40,000</td> <td>80,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Total</td> <td>88,000</td> <td>136,000</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		British.	Native.	Cabul and outposts in its vicinity ...	15,000	15,000	Candahar	15,000	15,000	Ghuzni and Kelat-i-Ghilzai	10,000	10,000	Communications between—			Cabul and Peshawur	5,000	10,000	Candahar and Quetta	3,000	6,000	Total	48,000	56,000	Obligatory garrisons in India	40,000	80,000	Total	88,000	136,000	<i>Traced.</i>
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	<p>As the army in India consists of 70,000 British and 150,000 native troops, a reinforcement of 18,000 British troops would be required, and a reserve of 12,000 more. Also drafts to keep up to strength the 100,000 British troops which would then be serving in India, would be required. Further, as the above estimate leaves a balance of only 14,000 native troops, the native army must at once be increased by at least 50,000 men. Sir F. Roberts likewise presses strongly the importance of constructing trans-frontier railways to the principal points which would be occupied in time of war.</p>																															
	<p>In his second Minute of the 26th August, 1891, Sir F. Roberts draws attention, in forcible terms, to the extreme danger to India from the near approach of Russia, the hopelessness of attempting to check her progress by attacks elsewhere than from India, and the impossibility of engaging her from India without reinforcements of British troops.</p>																															
	<p>The Governor-General in Council, in forwarding the above Minutes, concurs generally in the views expressed, and maintains that Sir F. Roberts "has established the gravity of the situation." Lieutenant-General Brackenbury (Military Member of Council) thinks that, were Turkey hostile, or even in a position of armed neutrality, Russia would not be able to withdraw troops from the Caucasus, and in that case calculates that only 30,000 Russians would be available for operations in Afghanistan, and that the troops available from India would be sufficient to hold our lines of communication and the Cabul-Candahar line against such portion of the 30,000 Russians as would reach the alignment. If, on the other hand, Russia were able to employ as many men as the theatre of war could support, the practical application of the acknowledgment by the War Office* "that in the national interest the Home Army will always be bound to support India to the</p>																															

*wo p 20 B.**wo p 20 A-B.**wo p 20.** February 14, 1888. *See wo p 22.*

SHORT SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL DECISIONS, &c.—(continued).

Date.	Summary.	Authorship.
September 1891—(continued).	<p>utmost extent of its power." would be rendered necessary.</p> <p>The Governor-General points out that we might be forced to occupy the Cabul-Candahar alignment at a time when it would be impossible to obtain a single man as reinforcement, and that a scheme complete as possible should be prepared based upon this assumption.</p>	Government of India, No. 180, Secret, of September 15, 1891, forwarding Minutes by Sir F. Roberts of June 8, 1891, and August 26, 1891—(continued).
March 1892.	<p>The following Resolutions were arrived at and forwarded to the India Office,* with the suggestion that they should form the basis of the reply to Government of India letter No. 180 (Secret), Military, of the 15th September, 1891:—</p> <p>I. The question of the number of European troops required for the defence of India is primarily for the Government of India, subject to the approval of the Home Government.</p> <p>II. The scheme for the defence of India must be based upon the troops actually under the control of the Government of India. No reserve for India, beyond the drafts necessary to complete the British units to Indian established strength, is maintained in the country.</p> <p>III. The home Army is maintained for the defence of the Empire (including India), wherever it may be threatened, and (without consultation with the Home Government) no forward line of policy should be laid down in India which contemplates the necessity of reinforcements from England for its accomplishments.</p>	Conference between representatives of War Office and India Office.
Apr 1892.	<p>In this despatch were embodied the foregoing Resolutions. It was also pointed out that in the event of this country being at war with a formidable naval power "no troops in relief, or reinforcements for India, other than a force accompanied by a strong naval escort could be moved at all, until the Navy had cleared the seas."</p> <p>If it is decided that the number of British troops in India requires to be strengthened, either at once or gradually, a specific and detailed statement should be submitted for consideration by His Majesty's Government, together with proposals for meeting the expenditure.</p>	Secretary of State for India (Lord Cross), No. 18, Secret, of April 8, 1892, to Government of India.
September 1892.	<p>After reviewing the foregoing despatch from Lord Cross, states the following conclusions:—</p> <p>(1.) That it would be, financially and politically, dangerous to allow Russia to occupy permanently Northern Afghanistan.</p> <p>(2.) In the event of Russia invading Northern Afghanistan, we should advance troops into Southern Afghanistan, at the Ameer's invitation or in default of it.</p>	Government of India, No. 132, Secret, of September 6, 1892, to Secretary of State for India. <i>Hand</i> 100 p 25.

* Duly embodied in despatch by Lord Cross to Government of India, No. 18, Secret, of the 8th April, 1892.

SHORT SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL DECISIONS, &c.—(continued).

Date.	Summary.	Authorship.
September 1892—(continued).	<p>(3.) We ought, if possible, to anticipate Russia at Cabul and Candahar.</p> <p>(4.) The troops India can put into the field would be sufficient for the temporary defence of the Cabul-Candahar alignment, provided Afghanistan were friendly, but that "such an advance from India, owing to the uncertainty of the Afghan alliance, and the effects of a possible reverse on the temper of the native army, would be attended with very great risks, and the Commander-in-chief in India—Lord Roberts—has declared his unwillingness to undertake such an operation unless he were assured that reinforcements to the extent of at least 30,000 British troops would be sent to India at the very earliest opportunity."</p> <p>(5.) "We cannot increase the Army, in time of peace, under existing financial conditions."</p>	Government of India— —(continued).
June 1893.	<p>Forwards views (see under) of Secretary of State for War and His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, with which Lord Kimberley concurs—in reply to Government of India, No. 132, of the 6th September, 1892. Lord Kimberley invites the Viceroy to concur "in thinking it undesirable to prolong the discussion, which can lead to no further results."</p> <p>Summary of views of Secretary of State for War (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) and His Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief:—</p> <p>(1.) If the occupation of Southern Afghanistan is necessary for the passive defence of India, the Government of India should make arrangements to maintain, in time of peace, a force in India sufficient for that purpose.</p> <p>(2.) It would not be desirable to permit India to adopt any policy based on reinforcements which it might prove impossible to provide.</p> <p>(3.) Can the Government of India, "in the event of Russian aggression in Afghanistan, maintain the defence of the Indian frontier and the political situation in India long enough to admit of the Imperial Government having time to consider the policy that should be adopted, and the steps to be taken to enforce it?" If the present force maintained is sufficient for this, it is adequate. If not, the Government of India should arrange for its increase.</p>	Secretary of State for India (Lord Kimberley), No. 20, Secret, of June 9, 1893, to Government of India.